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Benjamin Arriaga pleaded guilty to first-degree murder while vocally 
maintaining during the plea colloquy—in his native Spanish tongue—that he 
acted in self-defense. 
Mr. Arriaga is a native of Mexico, speaks Spanish, and has a fifth-grade 
education. In 2010, Mr. Arriaga shot Benacio Herrera after the two struggled over 
a gun. The State charged Mr. Arraiga with first-degree murder and two second-
degree felonies. The State and Mr. Arriaga’s trial counsel negotiated a plea deal 
where Mr. Arriaga would plead guilty only to the first-degree murder charge.  
Prior to the plea hearing, trial counsel met with Mr. Arriaga privately about 
the plea deal. But English-speaking trial counsel did not speak Spanish, and 
Spanish-speaking Mr. Arriaga did not speak English except for a few random 
words. Mr. Arriaga left that meeting believing he had to plead guilty.  
During the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga twice asserted that he acted in self-
defense. Neither the district court nor trial counsel explained to Mr. Arriaga the 
impact of his self-defense claim on his first-degree murder plea. Rather, the plea 
colloquy soldiered onward, and the district court accepted Mr. Arriaga’s guilty 
plea to murder.  
After his sentencing, Mr. Arriaga petitioned for postconviction relief. He 
asserted that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, and he argued that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not having an interpreter present in the meeting 
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before the plea hearing. The State moved for summary judgment on Mr. Arriaga’s 
petition, and the district court granted that motion.  
Mr. Arriaga then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, making the same 
arguments. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. This Court 
then granted certiorari on the question of whether the Utah Court of Appeals 
improperly affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction relief petition.  
 
Issue Presented 
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the district court’s denial 
of Mr. Arriaga’s petition for postconviction relief, when (1) the court held that Mr. 
Arriaga’s plea to first-degree murder was knowing and voluntary despite Mr. 
Arriaga’s self-defense assertions during the plea colloquy and (2) Mr. Arriaga’s 
English-speaking trial counsel did not have a Spanish-speaking interpreter 
during their meeting to explain the plea? 
Standard of review: The district court dismissed Mr. Arriaga’s 
postconviction petition on summary judgment. In reviewing that ruling, the 
Court of Appeals “viewed the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and reviewed the court’s legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness.” 
Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C., 2016 UT 7, ¶ 11, 367 P.3d 1006 (quotation 
omitted and cleaned up).  
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“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on 
appeal presents a question of law that [an appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness.” State v. Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶ 18, 424 P.3d 845 (quotation omitted 
and cleaned up).  
  “On a writ of certiorari, [the Supreme Court] review[s] the decision of 
the Court of Appeals . . . and appl[ies] the same standard of review used by 
the Court of Appeals. [The Supreme Court] conduct[s] that review for 
correctness, ceding no deference to the Court of Appeals.” State v. Wilder, 2018 
UT 17, ¶ 15, 420 P.3d 1064 (cleaned up). 
Preservation: Mr. Arriaga argued in the district court and in the Court of 
Appeals that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that trial counsel was 




Statement of the Case 
1. Mr. Arriaga Shoots Mr. Herrera During a Struggle1 
In 2010, Mr. Arriaga became distraught and angry after discovering that 
Benacio Herrera had an affair with his wife. (R. 105, 166, 176, 213–14.)2 Mr. 
Arriaga confronted Mr. Herrera about the affair. (R. 167, 228.) The two 
exchanged punches. (R. 167.) Then Mr. Arriaga pulled a gun out of his waistband, 
intending to scare Mr. Herrera but not shoot. (R. 228.) Mr. Herrera asked Mr. 
Arriaga to forgive him, and Mr. Arriaga said that “this kind of thing is not 
forgiven.” (R. 694.) Mr. Herrera lunged at Mr. Arriaga and tried to grab the gun. 
(R. 167, 228.) The gun went off, and Mr. Herrera was shot five times—twice in 
front, twice in the back, and once in the back of his head. (R. 141.) 
2. Mr. Arriaga Meets with Trial Counsel about a Plea 
The State charged Mr. Arriaga with first-degree murder and two other 
second-degree felonies. (R. 61, 77.)  
The district court found Mr. Arriaga indigent and appointed him counsel. 
(Add. D, Docket in State v. Arriaga, No. 101400853, at 3.) Trial counsel litigated 
                                              
1 Because the district court dismissed Mr. Arriaga’s petition on summary 
judgment after a partial evidentiary hearing, the facts below are recited in the 
light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga. See Judge, 2016 UT 7, ¶ 11. The evidentiary 
hearing in this case was not completed (and consequently did not include 
testimony about the issues raised in this appeal), so the facts are drawn from Mr. 
Arriaga’s postconviction petition, evidence submitted with the parties’ filings, and 
relevant material from the evidentiary hearing.  
 
2 Although they were still married, Mr. Arriaga was separated from his wife 
at the time the affair occurred. (R. 200.) 
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a preliminary hearing and a failed motion to suppress. (Add. D at 7, 14.) In an 
April 2011 hearing, trial counsel informed the court that the matter would be 
resolved by Mr. Arriaga pleading guilty to first-degree murder. (R. 410.)  
Immediately prior to that hearing, Mr. Arriaga met with trial counsel. 
(Add. C, R. 1178.) 
Mr. Arriaga is a native of Mexico, speaks Spanish, and has a fifth-grade 
education. (R. 1339–40.) At the time of the shooting, Mr. Arriaga did not speak 
English except for a few random words. (Add. C, R. 1177.) English-speaking trial 
counsel did not speak Spanish. (Id.) 
Even though trial counsel and Mr. Arriaga had a language barrier, trial 
counsel did not have a Spanish-speaking interpreter present during their 
meeting. (Add. C, R. 1177–78.) Because no interpreter was present at that 
meeting, Mr. Arriaga believed trial counsel told him he had already been found 
guilty and that he had to plead guilty that day. (Add. C, R. 1177.) Mr. Arriaga did 
not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was innocent until 
proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.) Had Mr. Arriaga known that he did not have to 
plead guilty, he would not have pleaded guilty and would instead have insisted on 
going to trial. (Add. C, R. 1179.) 
3. Mr. Arriaga Pleads Guilty to First-Degree Murder Maintaining 
Self-Defense  
After meeting with trial counsel, Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing. 
When he walked into the hearing, he was given a plea affidavit that was written in 
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Spanish, but he did not read it prior to signing it. (Add. C, R. 1178.) And during 
the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he understood from trial 
counsel—that he had to plead guilty that day. (Id.) 
At the plea hearing, an interpreter translated for Mr. Arriaga. (R. 78.) The 
district court informed Mr. Arriaga of his rights and then asked for a factual 
basis: 
 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, can you give me a 
factual basis? 
 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your Honor, on April 4th 2010 in 
Salt Lake County Mr. Arriaga-
Luna confronted a man who had 
been sleeping with his wife. An 
argument and subsequent fight 
took place at which time he pulled 
out a firearm and he shot the 
man[,] killing him. 
 
THE COURT: Is that what happened, Mr. 
Arriaga-Luna? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I defended myself. It was not my 
intention. I never thought about 
hurting him. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. Does that change the plea at 
all, counsel? 
 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, we had—we had 
discussed the imperfect self-
defense concept and that he did 
pull out a gun to get the man to 
confess to his sleeping with his 
wife. And that the man charged at 
him but was unarmed. So that is 
why he used a gun.  
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THE COURT: I will find that that is a sufficient 
factual basis.  
 
THE DEFENDANT: He was drugged and drunk and I 
didn’t know if he had a weapon, a 
knife and that’s why I . . . .  
 
THE COURT:  Okay. . . . Mr. Arriaga-Luna, do you 
understand that by pulling the 
trigger you knew you could cause 
the death of the gentleman? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  
 
THE COURT:  Okay. Thank you. I will accept that 
factual basis. Has anyone 
threatened you or forced you to 
enter this plea today? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
 
THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises to 
you? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, not [inaudible]. 
 
THE COURT: Thank you. . . . Mr. Arriaga-Luna, 
then to the charge of murder, a 
first-degree felony, how do you 
plead, guilty or not guilty? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.  
(Add. B, R. 413–15.) 
The district court accepted Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea and sentenced him. 
(Add. B., R. 415–16.) 
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4. Mr. Arriaga Petitions for Postconviction Relief 
After he was sentenced, Mr. Arriaga timely petitioned for postconviction 
relief. (R. 77, 1263.) In the petition, Mr. Arriaga asserted, among other things, 
that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to communicate with Mr. Arriaga in Spanish about his plea. 
(R. 1263–64.) 3 He supported his petition with an affidavit, where Mr. Arriaga 
described the meeting with trial counsel before the plea hearing and the language 
barrier between the two. (Add. C, R. 1176–80.)  
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. (R. 443, 
505.) The court received the testimony of the prosecutor; however, it only heard 
some testimony from trial counsel because it suspended the hearing to allow Mr. 
Arriaga to file an amended petition to add an allegation not relevant to this 
appeal. (R. 548–49.) 
Before the district court set another evidentiary hearing, the State moved 
for summary judgment on Mr. Arriaga’s entire amended petition. (R. 552–53, 
1320–21.) The district court granted the motion.  
In granting the motion, the district court held that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was 
knowing and voluntary and that trial counsel was not ineffective. (Add. A, R. 
1220.) It held that Mr. Arriaga had “not shown that he should not be bound by 
                                              
3 Mr. Arriaga originally filed a petition pro se. (R. 1.) The district court then 
appointed counsel, and the appointed counsel filed an amended petition. (R. 65.) 
The original counsel withdrew, and the district court appointed new counsel, who 
filed a second amended petition. (R. 445.) The State moved for summary 
judgment on the second amended petition. (R. 566.)  
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the representations he made during the change-of-plea colloquy” and had “not 
shown that he could not adequately understand his counsel’s advice about the 
guilty plea.” (Add. A, R. 1269.) The court also held, “Even if Mr. Arriaga 
misunderstood his counsel’s advice in relation to the guilty plea, any 
misunderstanding was cured by the Court’s plea colloquy and the Plea 
Statement,” so as a matter of law “Mr. Arriaga ha[d] not shown that his guilty 
plea was not knowing and voluntary.” (Add. A, R. 1270.) 
5. The Court of Appeals Affirms the Dismissal of the 
Postconviction Petition 
Mr. Arriaga appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. He raised two issues. 
First, he argued that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary; twice during 
the plea colloquy he made self-defense claims that negated an essential element 
of the murder charge and provided objective evidence that he did not understand 
the plea. Second, he argued that his guilty plea was the result of ineffective 
assistance of counsel; trial counsel should have had an interpreter present at the 
meeting before the plea, because trial counsel and Mr. Arriaga had a significant 
language barrier. Because of that language barrier, Mr. Arriaga misunderstood 
the necessity of entering a plea.  
In an opinion, two judges on the Court of Appeals held that Mr. Arriaga’s 
plea was knowing and voluntary because nothing in the record suggested that Mr. 
Arriaga lacked an understanding of the elements of murder. Arriaga v. State, 
2018 UT App 160, ¶ 15. One judge—Judge Pohlman—concurred in the result. 
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Judge Pohlman expressed doubt about whether the district court adequately 
resolved Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense assertions during the plea colloquy. Id. ¶ 25. 
But she ultimately concurred in the result because she concluded that Mr. Arriaga 
was not prejudiced. Id. ¶ 27. All three judges agreed that Mr. Arriaga did not 
show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to have an interpreter during 
their meeting before the plea hearing. Id. ¶ 20. 
Mr. Arriaga filed a petition for certiorari. This Court granted that petition 
on the question of “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in affirming the post-
conviction court’s denial of [Mr. Arriaga’s] petition for post-conviction relief.” 
 
Summary of the Argument 
Mr. Arriaga challenged his guilty plea under the Postconviction Remedies 
Act, which allows a court to vacate a guilty plea if the plea was not knowing or 
voluntary or if the plea was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court 
of Appeals erred when it affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction 
petition.  
Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Twice during the 
plea colloquy he asserted self-defense, which negated an essential element of the 
murder plea and provided objective evidence that he did not understand the plea. 
And looking beyond the record of the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga produced 
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evidence that the language barrier between him and trial counsel prevented him 
from understanding the plea.  
Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea was also the result of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. English-speaking trial counsel spoke no Spanish, and Mr. Arriaga is a 
native Spanish speaker who spoke almost no English. Right before the plea 
colloquy, Mr. Arriaga met with trial counsel without an interpreter. After that 
meeting, Mr. Arriaga believed trial counsel told him that he had to plead guilty. 
He would not have entered his plea had he not believed trial counsel told him he 
had to.  
Mr. Arriaga’s plea was not knowing or voluntary, and his plea was a result 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed 
the dismissal of Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction petition on summary judgment.   
 
Argument 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
Mr. Arriaga’s petition for postconviction relief. The Court of Appeals erred when 
it concluded that Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea was (1) knowing and voluntary and (2) 
not the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Arriaga will take each 
argument in turn.  
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1. Mr. Arriaga’s Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary 
Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty to first-degree murder while vocally 
maintaining—in his native tongue—that he acted in self-defense. But a self-
defense claim belies a first-degree murder plea. Neither the district court nor the 
attorneys adequately resolved the contradiction.  
Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense statements rendered his plea not knowing or 
voluntary, and thus subject to challenge under the Postconviction Remedies Act. 
Under that act, a defendant may challenge his conviction if it was obtained in 
violation of the United States Constitution. Utah Code § 78B-9-104(1)(a). A guilty 
plea is valid under the United States Constitution if “it is made voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences.” State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 16, 
279 P.3d 371 (quotation omitted). Consequently, a court must determine that a 
defendant “actually understood the charges, the constitutional rights, and the 
likely consequences of the plea and voluntarily chose to plead guilty.” State v. 
Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 16, 309 P.3d 230.  
In determining whether a plea is knowing or voluntary, appellate courts 
examine not only the transcripts of the plea hearing but also the evidence about 
the circumstances surrounding the plea. Id. Both the plea hearing transcript and 
the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the plea—viewed in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Arriaga—show that his plea was not knowing or voluntary. 
During the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga made self-defense statements that negated 
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his plea to first-degree murder. And the circumstances surrounding the plea 
show that Mr. Arriaga did not understand his plea, because trial counsel 
discussed the plea with him in English when Mr. Arriaga could only speak 
Spanish. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion, then, that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was 
knowing and voluntary was simply incorrect.  
1.1 Mr. Arriaga’s Self-Defense Statements Negated an 
Essential Element of His Murder Plea 
 
Mr. Arriaga twice asserted self-defense during the plea colloquy. Those 
statements show that his murder plea was not knowing or voluntary.  
A plea is not knowing or voluntary when the defendant does not 
understand the “essential elements of the crime to which he pled guilty.” 
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 30 (quotation omitted). “A necessary element of a 
murder conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses.” State v. Low, 2008 UT 
58, ¶ 45, 192 P.3d 867. An affirmative defense to murder is imperfect self-
defense. Utah Code § 76-5-203(4)(a), (c)(i). Imperfect self-defense reduces a 
murder conviction to manslaughter—a second-degree felony that does not carry a 
potential life sentence. Utah Code §§ 76-5-203(c)(i) (affirmative defense), 76-5-
205(3) (manslaughter is a second-degree felony), 76-3-203(2) (sentencing 
parameters for felonies).  
Mr. Arriaga made two statements during the plea colloquy evidencing that 
he did not understand the essential elements of murder.  
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When the district court asked for a factual basis, trial counsel responded 
that Mr. Arriaga and Mr. Herrera got into a fight, and Mr. Arriaga pulled out a 
gun and shot Mr. Herrera. (Add. B, R. 413.) Mr. Arriaga then stated, “I defended 
myself. It was not my intention. I never thought about hurting him.” (Id.) The 
district court then asked if Mr. Arriaga’s statement changed the plea, and trial 
counsel stated that he had discussed the “imperfect self-defense concept.” (Id.) 
Immediately after trial counsel finished talking, the district court noted, “I will 
find that that is a sufficient factual basis.” (Id.) Mr. Arriaga again interjected, “He 
was drugged and drunk and I didn’t know if he had a weapon, a knife and that’s 
why I . . . .” (Id.) The district court then asked Mr. Arriaga if he understood that 
by pulling the trigger he could kill Mr. Herrera, and Mr. Arriaga said yes. (Add. B, 
R. 414.) Mr. Arriaga then pleaded guilty. (Add. B, R. 415.)  
In circumstances where a defendant pleads guilty but makes statements 
during a plea colloquy evidencing either that he does not understand the charged 
crime or that negate an element of the charged crime, such pleas are not knowing 
or voluntary. See United States v. Culbertson, 670 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(vacating guilty plea when the defendant persistently disavowed responsibility for 
a certain amount of drugs, and the amount of drugs was an essential element of 
the crime); United States v. Suarez, 155 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the defendant did not plead guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
when the defendant stated, “I am only guilty of possession”); State v. Thurman, 
911 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah 1996) (holding that even though defendant acknowledged 
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at one point he had the appropriate mental state, he made repeated comments 
that negated his admission and consequently did not admit to the requisite 
mental state).  
For example, in United States v. Fernandez, the Seventh Circuit held that a 
native of Mexico who had only a fifth-grade education and a very limited 
understanding of English (the exact same situation Mr. Arriaga is in) did not 
understand the charges or the acts to which he was pleading guilty. 205 F.3d 
1020, 1026–27 (7th Cir. 2000). When the district court asked the defendant if he 
had done the things in the factual proffer, the defendant responded, “Not all the 
acts, partially”; when the district court asked what acts he did not commit, the 
defendant responded, “Yes, your Honor, I did.” Id. at 1026. The district court did 
not clear up the defendant’s confusion and accepted the defendant’s guilty plea. 
Id. The Seventh Circuit vacated the plea. Id. at 1030. 
Similarly, in People v. Ramirez, the court reasoned that a defendant who 
pleaded guilty to burglary made statements during the colloquy that negated the 
plea. 839 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329–30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). Specifically, the “defendant 
insisted during the plea colloquy, albeit in a confused and rambling manner, that 
he had permission to enter the residence through an open door and retrieve the 
items that he took. These statements explaining defendant’s presence in the 
house effectively negated his admission to the elements of knowingly entering 
unlawfully and intent to commit a crime therein at the time of entry.” Id. at 329. 
Because the district court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry into the defendant’s 
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mental culpability after making his statements, “there is no indication in the 
record that defendant’s misapprehension of the charges was corrected or that the 
plea was voluntary and rational.” Id. at 330.  
Along the same lines, the Seventh Circuit held that a Spanish-speaking 
defendant did not understand the nature of the conspiracy charges against him; 
the defendant made statements during the colloquy that showed he did not 
understand the concept of conspiracy or the specific acts to which he was 
pleading guilty. United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 771 (7th 
Cir. 2007).  
Similar to the defendants in these cases, Mr. Arriaga asserted twice during 
the plea colloquy that he acted in self-defense. (Add B., R. 413.) Although Mr. 
Arriaga seemed to claim perfect self-defense during the colloquy, he admits—for 
purposes of this appeal—that he would only be entitled to an imperfect self-
defense claim. If the State did not disprove Mr. Arriaga’s imperfect self-defense 
claim, Mr. Arriaga’s criminal culpability would drop from murder to 
manslaughter. But trial counsel and the prosecutor informed the district court 
that a sufficient factual basis existed for murder if Mr. Arriaga admitted only that 
he had knowingly and intentionally killed Mr. Herrera. (Add. B, R. 414.) This 
representation was incorrect because Mr. Arriaga made assertions that he was 
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trying to avail himself of a self-defense argument, an element that is completely 
separate from the knowingly and intentional killing element.4 
No one explained to Mr. Arriaga that he should not plead guilty to murder 
where the imperfect self-defense claim, if successful, would result in a reduction 
of the murder charge to a manslaughter charge. (See Add. B, R. 413–415.) Trial 
counsel never asked for a brief recess to discuss the self-defense issue with Mr. 
Arriaga and clear up his confusion. See Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d at 772 
(“At any point during the colloquy, the district court could have taken a brief 
recess in order to allow counsel to talk with his client confidentially, address [the 
defendant’s] apparent confusion, and determine if he did indeed wish to proceed 
with a plea. Such a conference might have helped to avoid the problems that 
occurred here.”  
 The district court—whose responsibility it is to “ensure that defendants 
enter pleas knowingly and voluntarily”—never asked Mr. Arriaga directly if he 
understood the implications of his self-defense claim. See Candland, 2013 UT 55, 
¶ 14. The court did ask trial counsel if the first self-defense assertion changed the 
plea, and trial counsel said that he had talked with Mr. Arriaga about imperfect 
self-defense. (Add. B, R. 413–15.) But immediately after trial counsel told the 
                                              
4 Murder is the knowing and intentional killing of another person. Utah 
Code § 76-5-203(2)(a). Imperfect self-defense applies when a defendant 
knowingly and intentionally kills someone but does it under a mistaken but 
reasonable belief that the killing was justified by law. Utah Code § 76-5-
203(4)(a). 
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court about that discussion, Mr. Arriaga again claimed self-defense; the hearing 
soldiered on without any further explanation. (Id.) 
Without understanding that he could admit to knowingly or intentionally 
killing Mr. Herrera and that he could still defeat the State’s murder charge 
through a claim of imperfect self-defense, Mr. Arriaga could not intelligently 
weigh the risks and benefits of going to trial versus pleading guilty. Mr. Arriaga’s 
admission that he knowingly or intentionally caused the death of Mr. Herrera did 
not resolve the issue of whether the killing was done in self-defense. Mr. Arriaga’s 
plea was not knowing because he did not understand that his imperfect self-
defense claim would reduce his criminal culpability from murder to 
manslaughter. 
The evidence on the record at the plea colloquy shows that Mr. Arriaga did 
not knowingly plead guilty.   
1.2 The Circumstances Surrounding the Guilty Plea Show that 
Mr. Arriaga’s Guilty Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary 
 
In deciding whether a defendant has entered a valid plea, courts examine 
both the transcript of the plea colloquy and the circumstances surrounding the 
plea, including the information the defendant received from his attorney. 
Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 16; Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, ¶ 17, 88 P.3d 353. 
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The circumstances surrounding Mr. Arraiga’s plea show that Mr. Arriaga did not 
understand his plea because of a language barrier between him and trial counsel.5 
Mr. Arriaga is a native of Mexico, speaks Spanish, has a fifth-grade 
education, and did not speak English except for a few random words at the time 
he pleaded guilty. (Add. C, R. 1177; R. 1339–40.) Trial counsel spoke English and 
not Spanish. (Add. C, R. 1177.) 
Immediately before the plea hearing, Mr. Arriaga met with trial counsel. 
(Add. C, R. 1178.) No interpreter was present, so Mr. Arriaga did not fully 
understand trial counsel. (Add. C, R. 1177.) In fact, what Mr. Arriaga believed trial 
counsel told him was that Mr. Arriaga had already been found guilty and that 
there was no need for a trial; that if Mr. Arriaga won at trial, he would still get 
prison time; that Mr. Arriaga had no choice but to sign the plea agreement to get 
a sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment; and that Mr. Arriaga had to plead 
guilty that day. (Add. C, R. 1177–78.) Because of the language barrier, Mr. Arriaga 
did not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was innocent 
until proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.)  
                                              
5 Mr. Arriaga made the factual assertions about the circumstances 
surrounding his guilty plea in his second amended petition. (R. 445–50.) The 
State did not answer the second amended petition; rather, the State moved for 
summary judgment. (R. 1321.) There was no evidentiary hearing on the second 
amended petition. (R. 1321; see R. 502–51.) But the State’s summary judgment 
motion and reply did not dispute any of the facts that Mr. Arriaga alleged about 
the circumstances surrounding his plea. (R. 823–28; 1198–1204.)  
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When Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing, he was given a plea affidavit 
that was written in Spanish, but he did not read it prior to signing it. (Id.) And 
during the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he understood from 
his trial counsel. (Id.) 
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga—which is 
required at the summary judgment stage—this Court should conclude that Mr. 
Arriaga completely misunderstood the nature of his guilty plea. From his trial 
counsel he believed he had to plead guilty, he did not read the plea affidavit 
before signing it, and during the plea colloquy he was operating under what he 
believed trial counsel told him. (Add. C, R. 1177–78.) His two self-defense 
statements during the plea colloquy evidence his confusion.  
The circumstances surrounding the guilty plea show that Mr. Arriaga did 
not knowingly plead guilty.  
1.3 The Court of Appeals Erred When It Upheld the Plea 
Although Mr. Arriaga pointed to his self-defense statements during the 
plea colloquy and his language barrier with trial counsel, the Court of Appeals 
still determined that the plea was knowing and voluntary. It founded its analysis 
on Mr. Arriaga signing a plea affidavit and the district court resolving the tension 
between the plea affidavit and the self-defense statements. It also disregarded 
Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction affidavit as self-serving and contrary to his 
statements during the plea colloquy. And the concurring judge concluded that 
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even if there was an error with the plea, Mr. Arriaga was not prejudiced. Mr. 
Arriaga will take each of these issues in turn.  
1.3.1 The Plea Affidavit Did Not Render the Plea 
Voluntary 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Mr. Arriaga told the district 
court that “he had reviewed and understood his plea affidavit, there is no doubt 
that [Mr. Arriaga] understood the elements of the murder charge at the time of 
his guilty plea.” Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 12. 
But the Court of Appeals is wrong. The plea affidavit did not mention self-
defense at all. (Add. F, R. 79–89.) The elements of murder are simply listed as 
“Def. did knowingly and intentionally cause[] the death of another.” (Add. F, R. 
81.)  
But the lack of an affirmative defense is an essential element of murder. 
See Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45 (affirmative defense is essential element of murder); 
Utah Code § 76-5-203(4)(a), (c)(i) (imperfect self-defense an affirmative 
defense). Because the plea affidavit said nothing about the affirmative defense of 
imperfect self-defense, the plea affidavit did not inform Mr. Arriaga of all the 
essential elements of murder. Mr. Arriaga could not have understood the impact 
of his self-defense claim by reading the plea affidavit.  
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1.3.2 Mr. Arriaga Has Overcome the Presumption That 
Trial Counsel Adequately Informed Him 
The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the plea was voluntary because 
trial counsel informed the district court he had explained imperfect self-defense 
to Mr. Arriaga. It explained: “Trial counsel assured the district court that the 
concept of imperfect self-defense had been explained to [Mr. Arriaga], and where 
[Mr. Arriaga] had previously told the court he understood everything counsel had 
explained to him, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that [Mr. Arriaga] 
understood how the imperfect self-defense theory applied in his case. 
Furthermore, with the benefit of an interpreter during the plea colloquy, [Mr. 
Arriaga] made no objection to trial counsel’s assurance that [Mr. Arriaga] 
understood.” Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 13. 
This reasoning ignores the realities of Mr. Arriaga’s situation.  
 “Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually 
may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant has been properly 
informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.” 
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). However, the presumption that a 
defendant’s trial counsel has appropriately informed the defendant can be 
overcome by statements a defendant makes during the plea colloquy.  
For example, in Hicks v. Franklin, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
defendant overcame the presumption that his counsel adequately informed him 
about the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty—second-degree 
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(depraved mind) murder. 546 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008). In that case, the 
defendant first affirmed during the plea colloquy that he had “talked over the 
charges” with his attorney. Id. But when the district court asked whether the 
defendant understood the charge, the defendant stated that he did not know what 
a “dangerous act” meant. Id. Furthermore, the district court’s explanation of 
“dangerous act” was erroneous, and the defendant’s attorney remained silent and 
did not correct the district court’s misstatement. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded, 
“[W]here a defendant affirmatively indicates to the court that he does not 
understand a critical element of the charge against him, the presumption that a 
defendant has been sufficiently notified by defense counsel of what he is being 
asked to admit will typically be unwarranted.” Id.  
In United States v. Weeks, the Tenth Circuit again held that a defendant’s 
statements during a plea colloquy rebutted the presumption that his counsel 
adequately informed him of the elements of the crime to which he was pleading. 
653 F.3d 1188, 1202 (10th Cir. 2011). Again in that case, the defendant affirmed 
during the plea colloquy that he fully discussed his conspiracy charge with his 
attorney. Id. But his statements during the plea colloquy showed that he did not 
understand the elements of conspiracy; specifically, he denied that he had 
“knowingly” done an act but was just a “party to it.” Id. The district court 
attempted to clear up the confusion; the defendant eventually affirmed that he 
now knew that there was a violation of the law. Id. at 1203. But the Tenth Circuit 
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held that the defendant’s admission “that he now knows those activities violated 
the law, is not definitively an admission he knew at the time he agreed to the 
activities that they were illegal.” Id.  
Similar to the defendants in Hicks and Weeks, Mr. Arriaga affirmed during 
the plea colloquy that he understood his conversations with his attorney, that he 
had been through a plea affidavit with his attorney, and that he did not have 
questions. (Add. B, R. 412–13.) But the plea colloquy did not stop there. Mr. 
Arriaga made self-defense assertions after his attorney gave a factual basis for his 
murder plea, and Mr. Arriaga again asserted self-defense after his attorney 
informed the district court that he had spoken with Mr. Arriaga about imperfect 
self-defense. (Add. B, R. 413.) At no time did the district court or trial counsel 
explain to Mr. Arriaga the implications of his self-defense claim, and Mr. 
Arriaga’s trial counsel did not ask for a recess to clear up Mr. Arriaga’s confusion. 
(Add. B, R. 413–414.) Mr. Arriaga’s statements during the plea colloquy itself—
self-defense assertions that were never sufficiently mitigated by the court or trial 
counsel—rebut the presumption that Mr. Arriaga’s trial counsel adequately 
explained the implications of Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense claims.  
Furthermore, Mr. Arriaga never recanted his self-defense assertions on the 
record during the plea colloquy. (Id.) Rather, he affirmed that he knew he would 
kill the victim by pulling the trigger. (Add. B, R. 414.) But merely affirming that 
he pulled the trigger, in the face of self-defense claims, is insufficient for a valid 
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first-degree murder plea. See Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45 (“[T]he absence of 
affirmative defenses is an element of murder.”). Because Mr. Arriaga made 
statements that he was acting in self-defense and did not recant those statements, 
he did not understand the elements of murder.  
The presumption that trial counsel adequately explained the implications 
of the self-defense claim to Mr. Arriaga is rebutted by evidence on the record—
Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense assertions during the colloquy (one of which was made 
after trial counsel said he had explained imperfect self-defense to Mr. Arriaga), 
the failure of the district court or trial counsel to explain the self-defense claims 
to Mr. Arriaga on the record, and the absence of any information about self-
defense in the plea affidavit. 
1.3.3 The District Court Did Not Resolve the Confusion 
Between the Plea Affidavit and the Self-Defense 
Statements 
The majority of the Court of Appeals reasoned that the district court did 
sufficiently address the conflict between the plea affidavit and Mr. Arriaga’s self-
defense statements when the court asked Mr. Arriaga “whether he knew that his 
actions, specifically pulling the trigger of the gun, would cause Victim’s death. 
Defendant acknowledged that he did.” Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 14.  
However, the concurring judge expressed concern about whether the 
district “court’s attempts to resolve the conflict were successful.” Id. ¶ 22. Mr. 
Arriaga’s acknowledgment that he knew that pulling the trigger would cause the 
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victim’s death, the concurring judge continued, “did not speak to the conflict 
created by his assertions: whether he understood that in pleading guilty to first 
degree murder he was conceding that the concept of imperfect self-defense did 
not apply.” Id. ¶ 24.  
The concurring judge was right.  
Murder is the knowing and intentional killing of another person. Utah 
Code § 76-5-203(2)(a). Imperfect self-defense applies when a defendant 
knowingly and intentionally kills someone but does it under a mistaken but 
reasonable belief that the killing was justified by law. Utah Code § 76-5-
203(4)(a). The affirmative defense is another element of murder that must be 
disproved by the State. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45.  
The district court merely asking Mr. Arriaga if he knew that he would kill 
someone by pulling the trigger did nothing to resolve Mr. Arriaga’s self-defense 
claims. That comment did not address the additional element of the State being 
required to disprove Mr. Arriaga’s imperfect self-defense claim.  
1.3.4 Mr. Arriaga’s Affidavit Is Not Self-Serving 
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Mr. Arriaga’s claims that he did 
not read the plea affidavit contradicted his own statements during the plea 
colloquy. “Here, there is no valid reason to doubt the truthfulness of [Mr. 
Arriaga’s] statements to the district court during his plea colloquy because an 
interpreter was present and [Mr. Arriaga] professed to understand everything 
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discussed with counsel and the contents of his plea affidavit.” Arriaga, 2018 UT 
App 160, ¶ 15. 
It is true that a defendant cannot merely allege in a postconviction petition 
that he did not understand what was going on during the plea colloquy. But that 
is not the case here. Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction affidavit explains why he made 
multiple self-defense assertions during his plea colloquy, despite his attorney 
representing to the district court that he had explained the implications of the 
self-defense claims to Mr. Arriaga. His postconviction petition affidavit does not 
contradict what happened during the plea colloquy; it explains why Mr. Arriaga 
acted the way he did during the plea colloquy.  
1.3.5 Mr. Arriaga Was Prejudiced 
The concurring judge was concerned about the validity of Mr. Arriaga’s 
guilty plea. But she concurred in the result because, she concluded, Mr. Arriaga 
could not show prejudice—he could not show it would have been rational to reject 
the State’s plea offer. Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 27. 
Under the Postconviction Remedies Act, “[t]he court may not grant relief 
from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes that there would 
be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts 
proved in the post-conviction proceeding.” Utah Code § 78B-9-104(2). The 
prejudice standard in the act is the same as the prejudice standard under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim: a “reasonable probability that, but for 
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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Utah courts have 
looked to the prejudice prong in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel caselaw when 
deciding whether defendants have shown prejudice in their postconviction 
claims. Landry v. State, 2016 UT App 164, ¶ 23 n.6, 380 P.3d 25 (“The Strickland 
prejudice requirement is the same standard a petitioner must demonstrate to 
obtain postconviction relief.”). This Court has also looked to ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel caselaw when deciding whether a defendant has shown 
prejudice under the plain error doctrine. See State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 21, 
416 P.3d 443; State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ¶¶ 21-23, 154 P.3d 788; State v. Dean, 
2004 UT 63, ¶ 22, 95 P.3d 276.  
This Court should continue to use the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
prejudice framework to decide whether Mr. Arriaga was shown prejudice. In a 
recent case, the United States Supreme Court considered how a defendant could 
show prejudice when he had pleaded guilty because of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964–69 (2017).  
In that case, the government charged a lawful permanent resident, Jae Lee, 
with drug possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 1963. Government officials 
had found drugs and cash in Lee’s home, and Lee had admitted that he had given 
drugs to his friends. Id. When offered a plea to drug distribution, Lee’s attorney 
told him to take the plea because he would likely receive a lighter sentence. Id. 
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Lee asked his attorney if he could be deported, and his attorney said no. Id. So 
Lee took the plea. Id. He later found out that his drug distribution conviction 
required deportation, and he sought to withdraw his plea because of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Id.  
The United States Supreme Court concluded that although Lee’s trial 
prospects were grim, he could show prejudice—he would have rejected the plea 
had he known that it carried the consequence of mandatory deportation. Id. at 
1967.  
The Court reasoned, “When a defendant alleges his counsel’s deficient 
performance led him to accept a guilty plea rather than go to trial, we do not ask 
whether, had he gone to trial, the result of that trial would have been different 
than the result of the plea bargain.” Id. at 1965. Rather, a court considers whether 
“the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.” Id. (quotation omitted).  
In deciding whether a defendant would have been better off going to trial, 
the Court differentiated between two types of claims: claims that trial counsel’s 
errors affected the defendant’s prospects of success at trial (such as trial counsel 
not filing a motion to suppress) and claims that trial counsel’s errors affected the 
defendant’s understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty. Id. at 1965. 
For the first set of claims—attorney error effecting the prospects of success at 
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trial—a defendant must show he would have been better off going to trial. Id. But 
for the second set of claims—attorney error effecting the defendant’s 
understanding of the plea—a defendant need not show he would have done better 
at trial. Id.   
Consequently, the Court rejected a per se rule that a defendant with no 
viable defense cannot show prejudice. Id. at 1966. It reasoned, “The decision 
whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a 
conviction after trial and by plea. When those consequences are, from the 
defendant’s perspective, similarly dire, even the smallest chance of success at trial 
may look attractive.” Id. at 1966. “For example, a defendant with no realistic 
defense to a charge carrying a 20-year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if 
the prosecution’s plea offer is 18 years.” Id. at 1966–67. 
According to the Court, “avoiding deportation was the determinative 
factor” for Lee, and Lee said that he “would have rejected any plea leading to 
deportation—even if it shaved off prison time—in favor of throwing a ‘Hail Mary’ 
at trial.” Id. at 1967. Because deportation was so important to Lee, it was not 
“irrational for a defendant in Lee’s position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial. 
But for his attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the 
plea agreement would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost 
certainly.” Id. at 1968. “Not everyone in Lee’s position would make the choice to 
reject the plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.” Id. at 1969.  
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In this case, the State charged Mr. Arriaga with first-degree murder, 
possession of a dangerous weapon (a second-degree felony), and obstructing 
justice (a second-degree felony). Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty to first-degree 
murder, and the State dropped the two lesser charges. (Add. B, R. 410.) The State 
did not make a sentencing recommendation. The presumptive sentence for first-
degree murder is 15 years to life, Utah Code § 76-5-203(3)(b), and that is what 
Mr. Arriaga got. (Add. B, R. 416.) As the Court noted in Lee, the consequences of 
pleading guilty and going to trial were “similarly dire,” so “even the smallest 
chance of success at trial may look attractive.” Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966.  
And the error here was not one that affected Mr. Arriaga’s trial prospects. 
Rather, the error is the failure to inform Mr. Arriaga about the relationship 
between his self-defense claim and his murder plea. Like the defendant in Lee, 
Mr. Arriaga made statements during the plea colloquy about what really mattered 
to him—his self-defense claim. And he submitted a postconviction affidavit where 
he said that if he actually understood the nature of his plea, he would not have 
pleaded guilty. (Add. C, R. 1179.)  
Admittedly, Mr. Arriaga’s chances at trial may have been slim. He shot Mr. 
Herrera five times, two of which hit him in the back and one that hit him in the 
back of the head. But the only evidence against Mr. Arriaga was a statement that 
he made to the police, where Mr. Arriaga said that he got into a fight with Mr. 
Herrera and that Mr. Herrera lunged at Mr. Arriaga before Mr. Arriaga shot him. 
 32 
(R. 215.)6 That evidence would support an imperfect self-defense instruction. See 
Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 34 (holding that district court properly instructed the jury on 
imperfect self-defense when the defendant testified that he shot the victim after 
the victim charged him).  
Through his postconviction affidavit and his self-defense statements 
during the plea colloquy, Mr. Arriaga has shown a reasonable probability that “he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee, 137 
S. Ct. at 1966 (quotation omitted). And given that the plea bargain was not 
substantially better than what he would have received had he been found guilty at 
trial, it was not irrational for him to decline the plea and go to trial.  
 
 
In sum, this Court should conclude that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was not 
knowing or voluntary. His self-defense statements during the plea colloquy, left 
unresolved by the district court and trial counsel, negated an essential element of 
his plea. And given the evidence of the language barrier between trial counsel and 
Mr. Arriaga—evidence that must be viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Arriaga—trial counsel’s brief assertion that he talked about imperfect self-defense 
with Mr. Arriaga does not correct the error. Furthermore, Mr. Arriaga’s self-
                                              
6 According to trial counsel, the State’s case relied on two main pieces of 
evidence: a statement from Mr. Arriaga’s brother and Mr. Arriaga’s statement to 
the police. (R. 527–28.) The brother fled the country and was likely unavailable 
to testify. (R. 528.) That left only Mr. Arriaga’s statement to the police. 
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defense statements and postconviction affidavit show that had he known about 
the impact of his self-defense assertions on his murder plea, he would have 
chosen to forgo the plea and go to trial. Consequently, this Court should reverse 






2. Mr. Arriaga’s Counsel Was Ineffective 
Before the Court of Appeals, Mr. Arriaga also argued that his guilty plea 
was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Under the Postconviction Remedies Act, a defendant may challenge his 
conviction if it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Utah Code § 
78B-9-104(1)(d). Mr. Arriaga’s trial counsel was ineffective when he did not use 
an interpreter to explain the plea to Mr. Arriaga. As a result of that failure, Mr. 
Arriaga believed he was required to plead guilty to murder.  
For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Arriaga must satisfy the 
Strickland standard, which requires him to prove “(1) that counsel’s performance 
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) that but for counsel’s deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different.” State v. Larrabee, 2013 
UT 70, ¶ 18, 321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). Mr. Arriaga satisfies the 
Strickland standard.  
2.1 Mr. Arriaga’s Trial Counsel Was Deficient 
Trial counsel was deficient when he did not use an interpreter to advise Mr. 
Arriaga about his guilty plea in a meeting before the plea hearing.  
“[T]he right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined or 
enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays in 
securing convictions and determining sentences.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 
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169 (2012). That is because our criminal justice system “is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions 
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” Id.  
As our system is one of pleas, a defendant has a right to effective assistance 
of counsel when being advised whether to enter a guilty plea. Id.; Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). Also, an attorney “shall explain a matter to the 
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation.” Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.4(b). “[C]ourts in other 
jurisdictions have explained in addressing the constitutional concerns raised by 
failing to provide an interpreter for an accused, every criminal defendant—if the 
right to be present is to have meaning—[must] possess sufficient present ability 
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” 
Ling v. State, 702 S.E.2d 881, 883 (Ga. 2010) (quotation omitted). In fact, “[o]ne 
who is unable to communicate effectively in English and does not receive an 
interpreter’s assistance is no more competent to proceed than an individual who 
is incompetent due to mental incapacity.” Id.   
Mr. Arriaga is a native Spanish speaker with a fifth-grade education who 
did not speak English (with the exception of a few random words) at the time he 
pleaded guilty, and his trial counsel did not speak Spanish. (Add. C, R. 1177; R. 
1339–40.) 
No interpreter was present when Mr. Arriaga met with trial counsel before 
the plea hearing; because there was no interpreter, Mr. Arriaga misunderstood 
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trial counsel’s advice about the plea. (Add. C, R. 1177–78.) Mr. Arriaga believed 
trial counsel told him that he had already been found guilty and that there was no 
need for a trial; that if Mr. Arriaga won at trial, he would still get prison time; and 
that Mr. Arriaga had to plead guilty that day. (Id.) Because of the language 
barrier, Mr. Arriaga did not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and 
that he was innocent until proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.)  
When Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing, he was given a plea affidavit 
that was written in Spanish, but he did not read it prior to signing it. (Id.) And 
during the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he understood from 
trial counsel. (Id.) That Mr. Arriaga misunderstood what was going on is 
evidenced by his two assertions during the plea colloquy that he acted in self-
defense. (Add. B, R. 413.) 
Trial counsel was deficient when he did not use an interpreter to 
communicate with Mr. Arriaga about his guilty plea. A criminal defendant must 
adequately understand the contours of his constitutional rights and the facts 
underlying his plea before he can make an informed decision about whether to 
plead guilty. See Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 16. When the substantive conversation 
between an attorney and his client about those protections and those facts takes 
place without an interpreter, and the attorney and the client do not speak the 
same language, the attorney’s conduct falls below the objective standard of 
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reasonableness. See Ling, 702 S.E.2d at 883.7 An attorney cannot fulfill his duties 
to communicate with his client and to give his client sufficient information to 
make an informed decision when the attorney and the client speak different 
languages and no means of translation is available. Trial counsel was ineffective 
when he did not use an interpreter to communicate with Mr. Arriaga.  
The Court of Appeals, however, determined that trial counsel was not 
deficient. In so doing, it did not view the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Arriaga, as it is required to do on summary judgment. Rather, it flatly dismissed 
his assertions of a language barrier because Mr. Arriaga did not inform the 
district court during the plea colloquy that he could not communicate with trial 
counsel. Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 18.8  
Mr. Arriaga’s acknowledgment in the plea colloquy that he understood his 
conversations with trial counsel is undermined by his self-defense assertions. 
(Add. B, R. 412, 414–15.) If Mr. Arriaga truly understood what trial counsel told 
                                              
7 Even if trial counsel does use an interpreter, “[t]rial counsel may breach a 
duty owed to his client through the ineffective assistance of an interpreter. When 
an intermediary, such as an interpreter, is the only means of communication for a 
defendant and his attorney, any deficient conduct on the part of the intermediary 
can be imputed to the attorney as ineffective assistance.” Ledezma v. State, 626 
N.W.2d 134, 149 (Iowa 2001). 
 
8 One Court of Appeals judge also expressed skepticism at oral argument 
about the claims of a language barrier because Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction 
affidavit is written in English. But the hand that wrote the English portion of the 
affidavit was not the same hand that signed the affidavit. Mr. Arriaga received 
significant help from bilingual inmates when preparing his legal papers in 
English.  
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him about the plea, he would not have raised self-defense claims during the 
hearing. This Court should choose to “credit more fully [Mr. Arriaga’s] repeated 
statements” during a plea colloquy about self-defense—evidencing his 
misunderstanding of what trial counsel told him—rather than a one-worded 
“acknowledg[ment] at one point” that he understood his conversations with trial 
counsel. See Thurman, 911 P.2d at 375. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorably to Mr. Arriaga, trial 
counsel was deficient when he did not have an interpreter at the meeting with 
Mr. Arriaga before the plea hearing.  
2.2  Mr. Arriaga Was Prejudiced 
Mr. Arriaga can also show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 
deficient performance.  
To show prejudice, a defendant must prove that there is a “reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The 
reasonable probability standard does not mean that the defendant must show 
“that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the 
case.” Id. at 693. Rather, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Arriaga could not show prejudice 
because, given the evidence that Mr. Herrera was shot three times in the back 
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and twice it front, it was irrational for Mr. Arriaga to reject the plea to murder 
and go to trial. Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 20. But in making this decision, the 
Court of Appeals ignored binding United States Supreme Court precedent that 
changed the prejudice analysis for cases where a defendant took a guilty plea 
because of ineffective assistance of counsel: Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 
(2017). When an issue is a “matter of federal jurisprudence, our courts must be 
in lockstep with the United States Supreme Court.” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 
49, ¶ 3, 428 P.3d 1052.9 
Mr. Arriaga has discussed Lee extensively in section 1.3.5, above. In short, 
Lee held that for attorney error that effects the defendant’s understanding of the 
consequences of his plea—not attorney error that effects the defendant’s 
prospects of success at trial—a defendant does not have to prove that he would 
have had a viable defense at trial. 137 S. Ct. at 1965–67. “The decision whether to 
plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction 
after trial and by plea. When those consequences are, from the defendant's 
perspective, similarly dire, even the smallest chance of success at trial may look 
attractive.” Id. at 1966. “For example, a defendant with no realistic defense to a 
charge carrying a 20–year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if the 
prosecution’s plea offer is 18 years.” Id. at 1966–67. 
                                              
9 Lee was issued after the briefing concluded in this case, but before the 
Court of Appeals issued its opinion. Mr. Arriaga filed a Rule 24(j) letter with the 
Court of Appeals informing it of Lee.  
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In Lee, “avoiding deportation was the determinative factor” for Lee, and 
Lee said that he “would have rejected any plea leading to deportation—even if it 
shaved off prison time—in favor of throwing a ‘Hail Mary’ at trial.” Id. at 1967. 
Because deportation was so important to Lee, it was not “irrational for a 
defendant in Lee’s position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial. But for his 
attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the plea 
agreement would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost certainly.” 
Id. at 1968. “Not everyone in Lee’s position would make the choice to reject the 
plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.” Id. at 1969.  
As argued above, trial counsel’s error was not one that effected Mr. 
Arriaga’s prospects at trial; therefore, Mr. Arriaga does not have to prove that he 
would have prevailed at trial. Rather, trial counsel’s error went to Mr. Arriaga’s 
understanding about his plea. Because the error effected his understanding of his 
plea, Mr. Arriaga has to show whatever he misunderstood was important and 
determinative to him. He can do that.   
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga—as this Court 
must do when reviewing a summary judgment order—this Court should conclude 
that trial counsel’s error in not having an interpreter at the meeting before the 
plea prejudiced Mr. Arriaga. Mr. Arriaga stated in his postconviction affidavit 
that he completely misunderstood trial counsel during that meeting. (Add. C, R. 
1177–78.) He believed he had to plead guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.) And his assertions 
of self-defense during the plea colloquy show that he was operating under a 
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significant misunderstanding from his conversation with trial counsel. Mr. 
Arriaga stated in his affidavit that had he understood his conversation with trial 
counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty. (Add. C, R. 1179.) 
And like the defendant in Lee, it was perfectly rational for Mr. Arriaga to go 
to trial. The plea was not a significantly better deal. Yes, the State dropped two 
second-degree felonies, but the first-degree murder charge with a 15-to-life 
sentence still remained. (R. 410, 416.) And Mr. Arriaga did have a defense, unlike 
the defendant in Lee. The defendant in Lee had no defense to his drug 
distribution claim—the government had found drugs and money in his house, 
and the defendant had admitted that he gave drugs to his friends. 137 S. Ct. at 
1963. But here, Mr. Arriaga had an imperfect self-defense claim; Mr. Herrera 
lunged at him before Mr. Arriaga shot the gun. That self-defense claim was so 
important to Mr. Arriaga that he raised it twice during the plea colloquy.  
Under Lee, Mr. Arriaga can show prejudice—that if trial counsel had an 
interpreter at the meeting, Mr. Arriaga would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have proceeded to trial.  
This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals.  
 
Conclusion 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Arraiga, this Court 
should conclude that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was not knowing or voluntary and was 
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the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Arriaga requests that this Court 
reverse the Court of Appeals and reverse the district court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the State.  
DATED this 9thth day of March 2019.   
ADAMS LEGAL LLC 
 
 
/s/ Emily Adams   
Emily Adams (14937) 
ADAMS LEGAL LLC 
PO Box 1564 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 








Judge: Charlene Barlow 
This matter came before the Court on the State's motion for summary judgment on 
petitioner's second amended petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies act. The Court 
recognizes the assistance of James D. Gilson who was appointed by the Court to represent petitioner 
pro bono; the Court appreciates his willingness to assist in this case. 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. Arriaga filed a prose petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies act on April 
6, 2012. The Court reviewed the petition and ordered the appointment of counsel on April 12, 2012. 
As directed in rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court reviewed the petition and 
found that its claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not frivolous on their face and 
dismissed all claims not involving the ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. A copy of the 
pleadings were sent to the Utah Attorney General's Office. The ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims were allowed to proceed. 
The counsel originally appointed to represent Mr. Arriaga was allowed to withdraw and Mr. 
Gilson was appointed to represent Mr. Arriaga and was given time to become familiar with the case. 
Discovery was pursued and an evidentiary hearing was set for May 23, 2014. 
At the hearing on May 23, 2014, Mark Mathis, prosecutor for Mr. Arriaga's case, testified 
regarding the charging of the case, the strength of the case in his opinion, and discussions with 
defense counsel regarding plea negotiations. Rudy Bautista, trial counsel for Mr. Arriaga, testified 
as to his experience, his filing of the motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga's statements to the police, plea 
discussions with Mr. Mathis, his investigation into the evidence, the flight of Mr. Arriaga's brother 
1 
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(who had been considered a potential witness) after release from jail, and (to a limited extent) his 
discussions with Mr. Arriaga regarding resolution of the case. The hearing ended when counsel for 
Mr. Arriaga asked for time to amend the petition, which request was granted. 
The second amended petition was filed on September 19, 2014, with supporting exhibits. 
The State filed a motion for summary judgment on November 19, 2014, with supporting exhibits. 
A corrected memorandum in support was filed on November 20, 2014. On May 4, 2015, Mr. 
Arriaga filed a memorandum in opposition to the State's motion and, on June 8, 2015, the State filed 
a reply memorandum. 
The Court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment on September 4, 2015. 
Mr. Arriaga was present with counsel, James D. Gilson; the State was represented by Mark C. Field, 
Assistant Attorney General. The Court received argument and took the matter under advisement. 
Having reviewed the submissions, including exhibits, and the arguments, the Court now enters its 
ruling. 
DECISION 
The Court finds that summary judgment for the State is appropriate in this case for the 
reasons stated in the State's memorandum and reply memorandum in support of the motion. 
Generally, the Court finds that Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel acted within reason in his handling of the 
case. The Court finds that Mr. Arriaga assured the Court in the plea statement and in the colloquy 
that he was satisfied with the advice of his counsel and understood the rights he was giving up. His 
self-serving current claims that he didn't read the statement and didn't understand what he was doing 
are unavailing to negate his statements at the time of the plea. The Court also finds that there is not 
a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Arriaga would have rejected the plea and taken the matter to trial. 
His confession was not suppressed and, even if it had not been used at trial, the fact that the victim 
was shot five times, twice in the back, and once in the back of the head could have convinced any 
reasonable jury that the shooting was not accidental as claimed by Mr. Arriaga. 
Within this general outline of the Court's reasoning, the Court adopts the specific arguments 
that the State made in its memoranda to support the Court's conclusion that summary judgment is 




The State's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the petition for post-conviction 
relief is DENIED. 
The State is ordered to prepare an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law 
consistent with thi!, decision. _ 1 
DATEDthis_L_dayof £.i~k-- ,2015. 
3 
MARK C. FIELD (8340)
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER
Case No. 120404690
Judge Charlene Barlow
THIS MATTER COMES BEFORE THE COURT on the State’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on November 19, 2014.  Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga filed his opposition 
memorandum on May 4, 2015.  The State’s reply memorandum was filed on June 8, 2015.  Oral 
argument on the State’s motion was heard on September 4, 2015.  Mr. Arriaga was present and 
represented by his attorney, James D. Gilson.  The State was represented by Mark Field, 
Assistant Attorney General.  The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda, the relevant case 
law, all applicable rules and statutory provisions, and considered the oral arguments presented by 
The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: November 02, 2015 /s/ Charlene Barlow
10:58:40 AM District Court Judge
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counsel.  Now being fully advised, the Court enters the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and order GRANTING the State’s motion for summary judgment.
Background
On April 4, 2010, Mr. Arriaga confronted Benacio Herrera in an open field in West 
Jordan about claims that Mr. Herrera had slept with Mr. Arriaga’s wife.  At some point during 
the confrontation, Mr. Arriaga pulled a gun out of his waistband.  A struggle ensued and the gun 
discharged several times.  During his interview with police, Mr. Arriaga admitted that he asked 
Mr. Herrera whether he had sexual relations with his (Mr. Arriaga’s) wife, that Mr. Herrera said 
“no,” that this made Mr. Arriaga angry and they fought, and that he shot Mr. Herrera, but he only 
meant to scare him.
The State charged Mr. Arriaga with several offenses, including murder, a first-degree 
felony.  Trial counsel, Rudy Bautista filed a motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga’s incriminating 
statements to police, which the Court denied.  Mr. Arriaga then accepted a plea offer from the 
prosecutor and agreed to plead guilty to the murder charge in exchange for the other charges 
being dismissed.  After pleading guilty, he was immediately sentenced to the mandatory term of 
15 years to life in prison.  He did not pursue a direct appeal.
Mr. Arriaga timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, an amended petition, and 
then a second amended petition.  He raised several arguments that his conviction should be 
vacated.  First, he challenged the effectiveness of his attorney’s representation.  Mr. Arriaga 
argued that he spoke little English and because his attorney did not have a Spanish interpreter 
present during their private conversations, he misunderstood counsel’s advice concerning his 
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guilty plea.  He also claimed that counsel did not seek discretionary review of the Court’s denial 
of the motion to suppress, did not use the potentially appealable ruling as a basis for negotiating 
a better plea agreement with the prosecutor, did not seek concessions of the prosecutor in 
exchange for the guilty plea, did not advise him to go to trial where the defenses of self-defense, 
extreme emotional distress, lack of the required mental state, and lack of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt as to all the elements of the murder charge could have been pursued, and did 
not investigate the facts of the case, hire experts, and interview witnesses.
Second, Mr. Arriaga argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily 
entered.  He asserted that because of his limited ability to speak English and trial counsel’s 
failure to have a Spanish interpreter present during their private discussions, he did not 
understand that he was innocent until proven guilty, that he did not have to plead guilty, and that 
winning at trial would mean no prison time.  Third, Mr. Arriaga asserted that because of the 
misunderstanding that resulted from his limited ability to speak English and trial counsel’s 
failure to have a Spanish interpreter present during their private discussions prior to the change-
of-plea hearing, he did not understand his right to appeal his conviction, nor did he understand 
the time limit for filing an appeal.  
The State responded to the second amended petition with a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that relief was not warranted because Mr. Arriaga’s post-conviction proffer 
failed as a matter of law to establish that he received ineffective representation, that his guilty 
plea was invalid, or that he was denied his right to appeal.  Mr. Arriaga opposed the State’s 
motion.  
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Findings of Fact
1.  Mr. Arriaga was charged on April 14, 2010 with murder, a first-degree felony, 
purchase, transfer, or possession, or use of a firearm by a restricted person, a second-degree 
felony, and obstructing justice, also a second-degree felony.  
2.  The medical examiner’s report established that Mr. Herrera was shot five times, once 
in the abdomen, once in the leg, twice in the back, and once in the back of the head.
3.  A Spanish interpreter was not present when Mr. Arriaga’s appointed attorney, Rudy 
Bautista, met with him for approximately an hour at the jail and several times when Mr. Arriaga 
was transported to the courthouse for a hearing in the case.  
4.  Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga’s incriminating statements to the 
police, which the Court denied.  
5.  Counsel did not seek interlocutory review of the Court’s order denying the motion.
6.  The prosecutor offered to dismiss the obstructing justice and possession of a firearm 
by a restricted person charges in exchange for Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea to the murder charge.
7.  Mr. Arriaga accepted this offer.  
8.  A Spanish interpreter was present at the change-of-plea hearing for the benefit of Mr. 
Arriaga and the Court.  
9.  Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he was not suffering from any physical or mental 
impairment that would affect his ability to understand the proceedings.  
10.  Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he and his attorney fully discussed the contents of the 
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea (“Plea Statement”),  as well as his rights and 
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the consequences of pleading guilty.  
11.  The Plea Statement was written in both English and Spanish,
12.  Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood the contents of the Plea Statement and 
that he adopted each statement in it as his own, that he was satisfied with his attorney’s advice 
and assistance, and that he understood everything that his attorney had discussed with him.  
13.  Mr. Arriaga told the Court that he had no questions about anything in the Plea 
Statement.  
14.  Mr. Arriaga acknowledged in the Plea Statement and during the plea colloquy that he 
understood his right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront 
witnesses.  
15.  Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood his right to the presumption of 
innocence, and that if he wanted to fight the charges against him and go to trial, all he had to do 
was plead not guilty and his case would be set for a trial.
16.  Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that the elements of the crime of murder to which he was 
pleading guilty were that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another.  
17.  After trial counsel provided the factual basis for the offense, Mr. Arriaga told the 
Court that the victim was on drugs and drunk, that he was unsure whether the victim had a 
weapon, that he defended himself against the victim, and that it was not his intention to hurt the 
victim. 
18.  Trial counsel explained that he and Mr. Arriaga previously discussed the possibility 
of raising a defense of imperfect self-defense because the victim charged at Mr. Arriaga and that 
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is why he used the gun. 
19.  The prosecutor explained that in order for the guilty plea to be valid, Mr. Arriaga 
would need to state that he either intentionally caused the death or knowingly caused the death of 
the victim.  
20.  Without objection from Mr. Arriaga, trial counsel stated that Mr. Arriaga had 
authorized him to tell the Court that by pulling the trigger he knew that it would cause the 
victim’s death.  
21.  Mr. Arriaga specifically acknowledged that he understood that by pulling the trigger 
of the gun he knew he could cause the death of the victim.  
22.  Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood he would be pleading guilty to a first-
degree felony and that the minimum and maximum punishment was a prison term of 15 years to 
life at the Utah State Prison.  
23.  Mr. Arriaga also acknowledged that he understood that by pleading guilty he would 
be waiving his right to appeal his conviction and that if he wanted to appeal his sentence, he 
would need to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after his sentence was entered.   
24.  Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty to the charge of murder and requested the Court to 
immediately sentence him to the mandatory term of 15 years to life in prison.  
25.  Mr. Arriaga did not pursue a direct appeal. 
Conclusions of Law
1.  Mr. Arriaga bears the burden of pleading and proving the facts necessary to entitle 
him to post-conviction relief.  See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(1).
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2.  As the moving party on summary judgment, the State satisfies its burden “by showing, 
by reference to ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any,’ that there is no genuine issue of material fact.”  Orvis v.  
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶18, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
3.  Although Mr. Arriaga is entitled to the benefit of having the Court consider the facts 
and inferences in a light most favorable to him, to survive summary judgment he must show that 
he “could, if given a trial [or evidentiary hearing], produce evidence which would reasonably 
sustain a judgment in his favor.”  Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶43, 267 P.3d 232.
4.  To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. Arriaga must “show 
that counsel’s performance was deficient” and that the “deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
5.  While Mr. Arriaga must show that counsel’s actions “fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness,” id. at 688, to prove deficient performance, the Court “must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”  Id. at 689.  
6.  To satisfy the prejudice element of the Strickland standard in the context of a guilty 
plea challenge based on counsel ineffectiveness, Mr. Arriaga “must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would have been rational under the 
circumstances.”  Ramirez–Gil v. State, 2014 UT App 122, ¶8, 327 P.3d 1228 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); Hill  
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v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  
7.  Mr. Arriaga has not shown that he should not be bound by the representations he made 
during the change-of-plea hearing.  See Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 191 (4th Cir. 2000). 
Cf. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983)
8.  Mr. Arriaga has not shown that he could not adequately understand his counsel’s 
advice about the guilty plea, even though a Spanish interpreter was not present, and therefore has 
not shown that counsel performed deficiently for not having a Spanish interpreter present during 
their private discussions. 
9.  Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his attorney performed deficiently for not seeking 
interlocutory review of the Court’s order denying the motion to suppress, not seeking a better 
plea agreement, not advising Mr. Arriaga go to trial and raise defenses of self-defense, extreme 
emotional distress, lack of the required mental state, and lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
as to all the elements of the murder charge could have been pursued, and not investigating the 
facts of the case, hiring experts, and interviewing witnesses.  
10.  Mr. Arriaga also has not shown prejudice because he provides no facts or argument 
establishing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would have been 
rational under the circumstances.
11.  As a matter of law, Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his trial attorney was ineffective. 
12.  A valid plea is “one that has a factual basis for the plea and ensures that the 
defendant understands and waives his constitutional right against self-incrimination, the right to 
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a jury trial, and the right to confront witnesses.”  Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, ¶20, 203 P.3d 
976. 
13.  All the constitutional prerequisites for a valid guilty plea were satisfied in Mr. 
Arriaga’s case.  
14.  Even if Mr. Arriaga misunderstood his counsel’s advice in relation to the guilty plea, 
any misunderstanding was cured by the Court’s plea colloquy and the Plea Statement.  
15.  As a matter of law, Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his guilty plea was not knowing 
and voluntary.  
16.  Because Mr. Arriaga was fully informed at the change-of-plea hearing of his right to 
appeal and that the notice of appeal had to be filed within 30 days after his sentence was entered, 
as a matter of law he has not shown that he did not understand his right to appeal.  
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga’s petition for post-
conviction relief is DENIED.
This is the final order of the Court.  No further action is necessary to effectuate the 
Court’s order.
In accordance with rule 10(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judge’s electronic signature appears at the top of 
the first page of this Order.  END OF DOCUMENT
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Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
APRIL 19, 2011 
* * * 
THE COURT:  This is Case Number 101400853,
Mr. Bautista is here.  Who is here for the state?
MR. MATHIS:  Mark Mathis, Rob Neill for the state.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Mathis and Mr. Neill for the
state.
And Mr. Arriaga-Luna has joined us.  What are we
going to do today?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Your Honor, we're going to resolve
this matter.  What's anticipated is Benjamin will be entering a
guilty plea to count one, murder, a first degree felony.  In
exchange, the remaining counts will be dismissed.
THE COURT:  Is that the State's understanding?
MR. MATHIS:  It is, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Arriaga-Luna, will you please
state your full name?
THE DEFENDANT:  Arriaga-Luna.  
THE COURT:  First name?
THE DEFENDANT:  Benjamin Arriaga-Luna.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Thank you.  How old are you?
THE DEFENDANT:  I'm 38.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Do you have any physical or mental
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Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
THE DEFENDANT:  No.
THE COURT:  Have you taken any medication, drugs or
alcohol today that would impact your ability to understand?
THE DEFENDANT:  No.
THE COURT:  Okay.  You are giving up certain rights.
Was there a preliminary hearing held in this?  
MR. BAUTISTA:  There was, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  You are giving up certain trial
rights by pleading guilty today.  You have the right to be
presumed to be innocent.  You have the right not to testify
against yourself.  
You have the right to a speedy and public trial in
front of an impartial jury.  You have the right to cross
examine the state's witness and call your own witnesses.  You
have the right to an unanimous verdict on all elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.  You have certain appeal rights if you go to
trial.
You are giving up these rights by pleading guilty
today, do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Okay.  There are certain immigration
consequences by pleading guilty, too.  And you -- you address
or you know that you have these consequences, you might be
deported by pleading guilty, do you understand that?
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THE COURT:  Okay.  Thank you.  The change that you're
looking at is a first degree felony.  
Is there a minimum?
MR. BAUTISTA:  It's 15 years to life.
THE COURT:  Fifteen to life.  Thank you.  
The potential punishment is 15 years to life in the
Utah State Prison and a $10,000 fine.  That's the potential
punishment, do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Counsel, do you believe that he's
competent to enter this plea?
MR. BAUTISTA:  I do.  
THE COURT:  Do you believe he understands the rights
that he's giving up?
MR. BAUTISTA:  I do.  We've been working together for
over a year.  We did the preliminary hearing, as well as, the
motion to suppress which was denied.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Arriaga-Luna, are you
satisfied with the help that your attorney has given you?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  Do you fully understand everything that
he's talked to you about?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  I understand.
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THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Do you have anymore questions about
what's in that form?
THE DEFENDANT:  No.  None.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Counsel, can you give me a factual
basis?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Your Honor, on April 4th 2010 in Salt
Lake County Mr. Arriaga-Luna confronted a man who had been
sleeping with his wife.  An argument and subsequent fight took
place at which time he pulled out a firearm and he shot the man
killing him.
THE COURT:  Is that what happened, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?
THE DEFENDANT:  I defended myself.  It was not my
intention.  I never thought about hurting him.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Does that change the plea at all,
counsel?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Your Honor, we had -- we had discussed
the imperfect self-defense concept and that he did pull out a
gun to get the man to confess to his sleeping with his wife.
And that the man charged at him but he was unarmed.  So that is
why he used a gun.  
THE COURT:  I will find that that is a sufficient
factual basis.
THE DEFENDANT:  He was drugged and drunk and I didn't
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THE COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Mathis?  
MR. MATHIS:  Your Honor, I think for the colloquy to
be valid that the defendant will have to state that he did
intentionally take the life of Benacio Hernandez-Herrera.  He
had stated earlier that he did not intend for that to happen.
I think, for it to be a valid plea, he would need to state to
this court that he did intend to take his life.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Or knowingly, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Or knowingly.  Yes.  
MR. MATHIS:  Intentionally or knowingly.
THE COURT:  Yeah.
MR. BAUTISTA:  He is prepared to say, Your Honor,
he's asked that I say it, that by pulling the trigger he knew
that it would cause the death of the man.
THE COURT:  Mr. Arriaga-Luna, do you understand that
by pulling the trigger you knew you could cause the death of
the gentleman?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Thank you.  I will accept that
factual basis.  Has anyone threatened you or forced you to
enter this plea today?
THE DEFENDANT:  No.
THE COURT:  Has anyone made any promises to you?
THE DEFENDANT:  No, not [inaudible].
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understand what you're doing and you want to do this today, I
will have you go ahead and sign that plea form.  
Thank you.  Mr. Arriaga-Luna, then to the charge of
murder, a first degree felony, how do you plead, guilty or not
guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:  Guilty.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Thank you.  I find that
Mr. Arriaga-Luna is competent to enter this plea, that he
understands the rights that he's giving up, he's had the
advantage of counsel, that it's a knowingly and voluntarily
plea.  I will accept the plea and sign the plea form.
You have the right to be sentenced in no fewer than
two, nor more than 45 days from today.  You have the right up
until the time of sentencing to request to withdraw this plea.
But the request has to be in writing and you would have to have
good cause.  You would have to have a good reason not just that
you changed your mind.
What's anticipated with sentencing?  
MR. BAUTISTA:  Your Honor, we had discussed his
options.  He would ask the court to sentence him today.  He
understands that he is going to the Utah State Prison.  He's
asking to start his time there.  He also understands that by
being sentenced today he will be waiving an opportunity to file
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THE COURT:  Is that is correct, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Thank you.
Does the state have any input?
MR. MATHIS:  No, the state would go along with that
recommendation, Your Honor.  This case has involved the murder
of an individual who was an illegal alien.  To our knowledge in
speaking with the ME's office and law enforcement, there is no
known family members that are here.  I believe that they are
still all in Mexico.  And so as far as, like, representing to
the court anything from their side, I think that the crime
speaks for itself.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Anything further, Mr. Bautista?
MR. BAUTISTA:  None, Your Honor.  We would submit.  
Anything else you want to tell me, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?
THE DEFENDANT:  No, that's all.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Thank you.
It is the order of the court then that you serve a
prison term of 15 years to life at the Utah State Prison and I
will have you taken there forthwith.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Your Honor, that's my only matter, may
I be excused?
THE COURT:  Yes, thank you.
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Docket in original case 
                        3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
                       SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
 
                    STATE OF UTAH vs. BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA
CASE NUMBER 101400853 State Felony
________________________________________________________________________________
CHARGES
         Charge 1 - 76-5-203 - MURDER 1st Degree Felony                 
         Offense Date: April 04, 2010
             Plea: April 19, 2011 Guilty                                
             Disposition: April 19, 2011 Guilty                         
         Charge 2 - 76-10-503(2)(A) - POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY 
         RESTRICTED 2nd Degree Felony                                   
         Offense Date: April 04, 2010
             Plea: August 09, 2010 Not Guilty                           
             Disposition: April 19, 2011 Dismissed (w/o prej)           
         Charge 3 - 76-8-306(1) - OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE 2nd Degree Felony 
         Offense Date: April 04, 2010
             Plea: August 09, 2010 Not Guilty                           
             Disposition: April 19, 2011 Dismissed (w/o prej)           
 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
         DIANNA GIBSON
 
PARTIES
         Defendant - BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA                                      
         Represented by: RUDY J BAUTISTA
         Plaintiff -  STATE OF UTAH                                             
         Also Known As - BEN ARRIAGA (ARRIAGA-LUNA, BENJAMIN)                   
         Also Known As - BENJAMIN LUNA (ARRIAGA-LUNA, BENJAMIN)                 
         Also Known As - BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA (ARRIAGA-LUNA, BENJAMIN)         
         Also Known As - BENJAMIN ARRIAGA (ARRIAGA-LUNA, BENJAMIN)              
 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
         Defendant Name: BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA                          
         Offense tracking number: 34332767    
         Date of Birth: August 29, 1972
         Jail Booking Number:             
         Law Enforcement Agency: WEST JORDAN POLICE  
         LEA Case Number: 10H004593                     
         Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY    
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         Agency Case Number: 10011724                      
         Sheriff Office Number: 244670  
 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
         TOTAL REVENUE  Amount Due:          22.47
                       Amount Paid:          22.47
                            Credit:           0.00
                           Balance:           0.00
         REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY     
                        Amount Due:          10.00
                       Amount Paid:          10.00
                     Amount Credit:           0.00
                           Balance:           0.00
         REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY     
                        Amount Due:          10.00
                       Amount Paid:          10.00
                     Amount Credit:           0.00
                           Balance:           0.00
         REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES      
                        Amount Due:           2.47
                       Amount Paid:           2.47
                     Amount Credit:           0.00
                           Balance:           0.00
 
PROCEEDINGS
04-14-10 Judge STEPHEN ROTH assigned.                                           
04-14-10 Case filed                                                             
04-14-10 Filed: From an Information                                             
04-14-10 Filed: Information                                                     
04-14-10 Notice - WARRANT for Case 101400853 ID 12906534                        
04-14-10 Warrant ordered on: April 14, 2010 Warrant Num: 985195963 Bail 
         Allowed                                                                
              Bail amount:    1000007.00                                
04-14-10 Warrant issued on: April 14, 2010 Warrant Num: 985195963 Bail 
         Allowed                                                                
              Bail amount:    1000007.00                                
              Judge: MARK KOURIS                                        
              Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement       
04-15-10 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on April 16, 2010 at 08:32 AM in 
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         WJ Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS.                                     
04-16-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel                      
         Judge:   MARK KOURIS
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    salomet                                                  
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Interpreter: Patti McCoy (Spanish)                                 
                                                                           
        Language: Spanish                                                  
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
           Tape Count: 9:00                                                
                                                                           
        INITIAL APPEARANCE                                                 
                                         
        A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.               
        The Information is read.                                           
        Advised of charges and penalties.                                  
        The defendant is advised of right to counsel.                      
        The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an 
        enhancement to the penalties for a subsequent offense.             
        HEARING                                                            
                                         
           COUNT: 9:00
         Court orders bail to remain.                                      
         Hearing end 9:10  Courtroom 31                                    
        APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL                                             
                                         
        
        Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints SL County Legal 
        Defender to represent the defendant.
        
        Appointed Counsel:                                                 
        
               Name: SL County Legal Defender                              
               City:                                                       
              Phone:                                                       
        
        Affidavit of indigency has been completed by the defendant         
Printed: 03/09/19 15:54:31          Page 3
Page 3 of 17
CASE NUMBER 101400853 State Felony
________________________________________________________________________________
        Instructions to the defendant:                                     
                                         
        
        1. You are to immediately contact and consult with appointed 
        counsel.                                                           
                                         
        2. You are to cooperate with the appointed counsel in the defense 
        of this case.                                                      
                                         
        3. You are to keep appointed counsel advised at all times of an 
        address and a telephone number where you can be reached.           
                                         
        4. Attorney's fees for services of counsel may be assessed at the 
        time of sentence.                                                  
                                         
        ROLL CALL is scheduled.
             Date: 04/26/2010
             Time: 08:30 a.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 33
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: STEPHEN ROTH                                        
04-16-10 ROLL CALL scheduled on April 26, 2010 at 08:30 AM in WJ 
         Courtroom 33 with Judge ROTH.                                          
04-16-10 ROLL CALL rescheduled on April 26, 2010 at 08:30 AM     
         Reason:.                                                               
04-16-10 Filed: Affidavit Requesting Appointment of Legal Defender, 
         Signed by Judge M Kouris.                                              
04-20-10 Filed: Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office (Booking information)         
04-26-10 Minute Entry - ROLL CALL continued                                     
         Judge:   MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    alysons                                                  
        Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S                                         
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
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        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     CR 33   Tape Count: 959                           
                                                                           
        CONTINUANCE                                                        
                                         
        Whose Motion:
        The Stipulation of counsel.                                        
         Continued as counsel has just received discovery.                 
        The motion is granted.                                             
        ROLL CALL is scheduled.
             Date: 05/24/2010
             Time: 08:30 a.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 33
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN                                
04-26-10 ROLL CALL Continued.                                                   
04-26-10 ROLL CALL scheduled on May 24, 2010 at 08:30 AM in WJ Courtroom
         33 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.                                            
04-26-10 Filed: Appearance of counsel ATD Rudy Bautista                         
04-26-10 Filed: Formal request for discovery pursuant to rule 16 of the 
         rules of criminal procedure                                            
04-26-10 Filed: Notice of bond hearing                                          
04-26-10 Filed: Supplemental request for discovery                              
05-24-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call                                   
         Judge:   MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    debbiem                                                  
        Prosecutor: HAMILTON, TYSON V                                      
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
        Interpreter: Patty McCoy (Spanish)                                 
                                                                           
        Language: Spanish                                                  
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     ct rm 33   Tape Count: OTR                        
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        HEARING                                                            
                                         
        TAPE: ct rm 33   COUNT: OTR
         The spanish interpretor Patty came to me that the deft needs 
        continuance.  She said deft was transported, and  he's in cellroom.
        Roll Call hrg continued.                                           
        ROLL CALL.
             Date: 06/07/2010
             Time: 08:30 a.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 33
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN                                
05-24-10 ROLL CALL scheduled on June 07, 2010 at 08:30 AM in WJ 
         Courtroom 33 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.                                  
05-27-10 Warrant recalled on: May 27, 2010 Warrant num: 985195963               
              Recall reason: Defendant was booked                       
06-07-10 Filed: Motion to withdraw as court-appointed counsel                   
06-07-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call                                   
         Judge:   MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    debbiem                                                  
        Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C                                         
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     ct rm 33   Tape Count: OTR                        
                                                                           
        HEARING                                                            
                                         
        TAPE: ct rm 33   COUNT: OTR
         The deft was transported from jail.  On ATD's request, the 
        preliminary hrg set.  He requested for 2 Spanish interpreter.      
        PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
             Date: 07/21/2010
             Time: 01:30 p.m.
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             Location: WJ Courtroom 33
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: STEPHEN ROTH                                        
06-07-10 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on July 21, 2010 at 01:30 PM in 
         WJ Courtroom 33 with Judge ROTH.                                       
06-07-10 PRELIMINARY HEARING rescheduled on July 21, 2010 at 08:30 AM   
         Reason:.                                                               
06-15-10 Filed: Appearance of Counsel (ATD)                                     
06-24-10 Filed: First Supplemental Request for Discovery                        
06-24-10 Filed: Demand that the State Produce the Preparers of All 
         Reports and Chain of Custody Witnesses at Trial.                       
07-21-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing                         
         Judge:   DENNIS M FUCHS
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    alysons                                                  
        Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S                                         
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
        Interpreter: Pablo Silveira (Spanish), Randy Harrington (Spanish)  
                                                                           
        Language: Spanish                                                  
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     CR 33   Tape Count: 855-957                       
                                                                           
        HEARING                                                            
                                         
         This is time set for preliminary hearing. Susan Sprouse is present
        as the court reporter.  Neither party offers an opening statement. 
        The state calls James Bigelow and Brandon Turner. The witnesses are
        sworn, testify and are cross examined.                             
         The state offers exhibits 1, the medical examiner's report and 2, 
        certified copy of a prior conviction for the defendant. They are 
        received by the court. The state rests.                            
         Counsel advises that the defendant elects not to testify on his 
        own behalf. The defense rests. The courts finds probable cause as 
        to all counts and binds the case over to the district court. Matter
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        is set for arraignment.                                            
         The state moves to withdraw the exhibits. The court grants the 
        motion and they are returned to the state.                         
        PRETRIAL/BO is scheduled.
             Date: 08/09/2010
             Time: 01:30 p.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS                                       
07-21-10 PRETRIAL/BO scheduled on August 09, 2010 at 01:30 PM in WJ 
         Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.                                        
07-21-10 Judge ROBERT ADKINS assigned.                                          
08-01-10 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 07-21-2010                            
08-02-10 Filed: Response to Request for Discovery, by Marc Mathis.              
08-03-10 Filed: Transcript of Preliminary Hearing dated July 21, 2010.          
08-09-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea                              
         Judge:   ROBERT ADKINS
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    mindeec                                                  
        Prosecutor: MARTINEZ, ANDREA T                                     
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 248                    
                                                                           
        CHANGE OF PLEA                                                     
                                         
        Defendant waives the reading of the Information.                   
        Change of Plea Note                                                
        Spanish Interpreter present.                                       
08-09-10 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on September 07, 2010 at 01:30 
         PM in WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.                               
09-07-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE                       
         Judge:   ROBERT ADKINS
        PRESENT                                                            
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        Clerk:    pamfw                                                    
        Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S                                         
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A                         
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     Courtroom 36                                      
                                                                           
        HEARING                                                            
                                         
        TAPE: Courtroom 36 Off the record, parties agree to reset the 
        Scheduling Conference.                                             
        SCHEDULING CONFERENCE.
             Date: 09/20/2010
             Time: 01:30 p.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS                                       
09-07-10 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on September 20, 2010 at 01:30 
         PM in WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.                               
09-20-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE                                
         Judge:   ROBERT ADKINS
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    mindeec                                                  
        Prosecutor: MITCHELL, JENNIFER C                                   
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 146                    
                                                                           
        SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
             Date: 10/04/2010
             Time: 01:30 p.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
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                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS                                       
09-21-10 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on October 04, 2010 at 01:30 PM
         in WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.                                  
10-04-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE                                
         Judge:   ROBERT ADKINS
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    mindeec                                                  
        Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C                                         
        Other Attorneys: JOEL J KITTRELL                                   
        Defendant Present                                                  
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 203                    
                                                                           
        Spanish Interpreter Patty Mccoy present                            
        PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
             Date: 11/01/2010
             Time: 01:30 p.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS                                       
10-05-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on November 01, 2010 at 01:30 PM 
         in WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.                                  
11-01-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE                                
         Judge:   ROBERT ADKINS
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    mindeec                                                  
        Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C                                         
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
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        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 259                    
                                                                           
        MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
             Date: 12/20/2010
             Time: 08:30 a.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS                                       
11-01-10 MOTION HEARING scheduled on December 20, 2010 at 08:30 AM in WJ
         Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.                                        
11-30-10 Filed: Motion and memorandum in support thereof to suppress 
         statements of defendant                                                
         Filed by: BAUTISTA, RUDY J
12-17-10 MOTION HEARING scheduled on January 27, 2011 at 01:30 PM in WJ 
         Courtroom 36 with Judge ADKINS.                                        
12-17-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 101400853 ID 13464130                         
        MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
             Date: 1/27/2011
             Time: 01:30 p.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS                                       
12-17-10 MOTION HEARING Modified.                                               
12-17-10 Filed: Motion To Continue                                              
         Filed by: STATE OF UTAH, 
12-17-10 Filed order: Order of Continuance                                      
                   Judge ROBERT ADKINS
                   Signed December 17, 2010
12-17-10 MOTION HEARING scheduled on January 27, 2011 at 01:30 PM in WJ 
         Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.                                        
12-22-10 Judge CHARLENE BARLOW assigned.                                        
12-27-10 Filed: Notice of Motion Hearing, returned to sender for Rudy 
         Bautista                                                               
01-13-11 Filed: Affidavit re: Application for material witness warrant 
         and order                                                              
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01-13-11 Filed: Application for material witness warrant                        
01-13-11 Filed order: Material witness warrant                                  
                   Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
                   Signed January 11, 2011
01-13-11 Filed order: Order for material witness warrant                        
                   Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
                   Signed January 11, 2011
01-27-11 Filed: Response to request for discovery                               
01-28-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE                                
         Judge:   CHARLENE BARLOW
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    mindeec                                                  
        Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S                                         
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 226                    
                                                                           
        MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
             Date: 02/09/2011
             Time: 01:30 p.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW                                     
01-28-11 MOTION HEARING scheduled on February 09, 2011 at 01:30 PM in WJ
         Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.                                        
02-04-11 Filed: Motion to continue                                              
         Filed by: STATE OF UTAH, 
02-08-11 Filed order: Order of continuance                                      
                   Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
                   Signed February 08, 2011
02-09-11 MOTION HEARING scheduled on March 10, 2011 at 01:30 PM in WJ 
         Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.                                        
02-09-11 Notice - NOTICE for Case 101400853 ID 13570716                         
        MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
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             Date: 03/10/2011
             Time: 01:30 p.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW                                     
02-18-11 Filed: Response To Defendant's Motion and Memorandum In Support
         Thereof To Suppress Statements Of Defendant                            
03-10-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING                              
         Judge:   CHARLENE BARLOW
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    mindeec                                                  
        Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C                                         
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 413                    
                                                                           
        HEARING                                                            
                                         
        TAPE: courtroom 36   COUNT: 425
         State's witness #1 Detective Brandon Turner, sworn and testified. 
           COUNT: 446
         Mr. Mathis argues motion to suppress                              
           COUNT: 509
         Mr. Bautista argues motion to suppress                            
           COUNT: 521
         Mr. Mathis responds.                                              
           COUNT: 528
         Mr. Bautista responds.                                            
         The Court takes the matter under advisement.                      
         The State has until 3-15-11 to provide any supplemental briefing, 
        Mr. Bautista to respond by 3-18-11.                                
        Spanish Interpreter Patty Mccoy present                            
        PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
             Date: 03/24/2011
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             Time: 01:30 p.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW                                     
03-10-11 Filed: Stipulated Statement of Facts submitted by Mr Marc C.S. 
         Mathis.                                                                
03-10-11 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on March 24, 2011 at 01:30 PM in 
         WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.                                     
03-24-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING                              
         Judge:   CHARLENE BARLOW
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    mindeec                                                  
        Prosecutor: NEILL, ROBERT G                                        
        Other Attorneys: JOEL J KITTRELL                                   
        Defendant Present                                                  
                                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 216                    
                                                                           
        HEARING                                                            
                                         
        TAPE: courtroom 36   COUNT: 216
         Parties address the Court                                         
         The Court denies motion to suppress, the State to prepare the 
        Finding, Conclusion and Order.                                     
        Spanish Interpreter Patty Mccoy present                            
        PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
             Date: 04/07/2011
             Time: 08:30 a.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW                                     
03-24-11 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on April 07, 2011 at 08:30 AM in 
         WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.                                     
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04-07-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference                         
         Judge:   CHARLENE BARLOW
        PRESENT                                                            
        Clerk:    leahr                                                    
        Prosecutor: NEILL, ROBERT G                                        
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Interpreter: mccoy patty (Spanish)                                 
                                                                           
        Language: Spanish                                                  
        Sheriff Office#: 244670                                            
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 11:11                  
                                                                           
        HEARING                                                            
                                         
        TAPE: courtroom 36   COUNT: 11:11
         On Record, Defendant present, Patty Mccoy Spanish Interperter 
        present. On Defense counsels motion, court orders case set for a 
        Pre-Trial Conference.                                              
        PRETRIAL CONFERENCE.
             Date: 04/19/2011
             Time: 08:30 a.m.
             Location: WJ Courtroom 36
                       8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
                       SUITE 1701
                       WEST JORDAN, UT  84088
         Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW                                     
04-07-11 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on April 19, 2011 at 08:30 AM in 
         WJ Courtroom 36 with Judge BARLOW.                                     
04-07-11 Filed order: Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law. (Signed as 
         approved as to form by Rudy Bautista, and Marc C.S. Mathis)            
                   Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
                   Signed April 07, 2011
04-19-11 Filed: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment                                  
04-19-11 Filed: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and 
         Certificate of Counsel                                                 
04-19-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE                                
         Judge:   CHARLENE BARLOW
        PRESENT                                                            
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        Clerk:    mindeec                                                  
        Prosecutor: MATHIS, MARC C                                         
        Defendant Present                                                  
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                          
                                                                           
        Audio                                                              
        Tape Number:     courtroom 36   Tape Count: 1039                   
                                                                           
        Defendant waives the reading of the Information.                   
        Defendant waives time for sentence.                                
        SENTENCE PRISON                                                    
        Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, 
        the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
        than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
        
        To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:  The defendant is remanded to your
        custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
        defendant will be confined.                                        
        
        ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE                                           
        BEN ARRIAGA                                                        
        BENJAMIN LUNA                                                      
        BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA                                              
        BENJAMIN ARRIAGA                                                   
                                                                           
        Spanish Interpreter Patty Mccoy present.                           
04-19-11 Charge 1  Disposition is Guilty                                        
04-19-11 Charge 2  Disposition is Dismissed                                     
04-19-11 Charge 3  Disposition is Dismissed                                     
04-19-11 Note: INCOURT NOTE minutes modified.                                   
04-19-11 Case Closed                                                             
         Disposition Judge is CHARLENE BARLOW                                    
04-29-11 Note: Archived Physical File FP-0079                                   
05-04-11 Fee Account created       Total Due:         10.00                     
05-04-11 AUDIO TAPE COPY          Payment Received:          10.00              
              Note: Mail Payment;                                       
12-12-11 Filed: Letter from Defendant                                           
12-14-11 Note: Copies of letter given to the LDA's and DA's office.             
06-18-12 Filed: Letter from the defendant                                       
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07-13-12 Note: Copy of letter from Mr. Arriaga-Luna submitted to the DA 
               and LDA's office.                                                
08-13-12 Filed: Motion for release of record and transcripts                    
         Filed by: STATE OF UTAH, 
08-13-12 Note: Paperwork to Judge for signature                                 
08-14-12 Filed order: Order releasing record and transcripts                    
                   Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
                   Signed August 14, 2012
08-15-12 Note: File mailed to:  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTN: 
               MARK C. FIELD, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 160 EAST 300 
               SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR, PO BOX 140854, SALT LAKE CITY UT 
               84114-0854. Certified.                                           
08-22-12 Filed: Certifide mail return receipt                                   
09-17-12 Fee Account created       Total Due:         10.00                     
09-17-12 Fee Account created       Total Due:          2.47                     
09-17-12 AUDIO TAPE COPY          Payment Received:          10.00              
              Note: POSTAGE-COPIES                                      
09-17-12 POSTAGE-COPIES           Payment Received:           2.47              
09-18-12 Filed: Request for Recording-Bryan Stoddard                            
09-18-12 Note: CD mailed                                                        
11-26-12 Filed: Request for Recording-AG                                        
11-26-12 Note: CD ready for pick up in Jury Room                                
12-31-12 Filed: Request for Recording-AG                                        
12-31-12 Note: CD ready for pick up in Jury Room                                
09-16-13 Filed: Letter from Defendant                                           
12-24-13 Filed: Response to Subpoena Duces Tecum                                
03-15-14 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 04-19-2011                            
03-18-14 Filed: Received Transcript of Sentence, Judgment and 
         Commitment, dated 4/19/2011                                            
04-30-14 Filed: Request fot Status                                              
07-02-16 Judge HEATHER BRERETON assigned.                                       
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Emily Adams, Attorney for Appellant1 
Sean D. Reyes and Mark C. Field, Attorneys 
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JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which 
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER concurred. JUDGE JILL 
M. POHLMAN concurred in part and concurred in the result in 
part, with opinion. 
                                                                                                                    
1. Postconviction proceedings are civil in nature, and defendants 
who bring such petitions do not have the right to appointed 
counsel. See Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, ¶ 20, 84 P.3d 1150. 
But when Appellant filed his postconviction petition pro se, he 
requested that counsel be appointed, and the district court 
granted this request. If a petition is not summarily dismissed, the 
court may appoint counsel “on a pro bono basis” to represent 
the defendant. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109(1) (LexisNexis 
2012). We appreciate the district court’s decision to appoint 
counsel in this case because it has helped us better understand 
Appellant’s claims and arguments. And we appreciate the 
willingness of appellate counsel, as well as that of James D. 
Gilson, who represented Appellant below, to accept these 
appointments. 
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ORME, Judge: 
 Appellant Benjamin Arriaga (Defendant) appeals the ¶1
district court’s order granting the State’s summary judgment 
motion and denying his petition for postconviction relief. 
Defendant pled guilty to murder, a first degree felony, and was 
sentenced to prison in 2011. He now challenges his guilty plea 
on the grounds that it was not knowing or voluntary and that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the 
summary judgment denying his petition for postconviction 
relief. 
BACKGROUND 
 Defendant admitted to police that, on April 4, 2010, he ¶2
shot and killed the man (Victim) who was having an affair with 
his wife. He explained that, having discovered the affair, he 
angrily confronted Victim in a park. Defendant then pointed a 
gun at Victim, intending to scare him into admitting to the affair. 
When Victim admitted to sleeping with Defendant’s wife, 
Defendant replied that “this kind of thing is not forgiven.” 
Defendant said that Victim then lunged for the gun, and a 
struggle ensued. Defendant told police that the gun discharged 
several times in the course of the struggle, and Victim was shot 
once in the abdomen, once in the leg, twice in the back, and once 
in the back of the head.  
 The State charged Defendant with murder, a first degree ¶3
felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017); 
the purchase, transfer, possession, or use of a firearm by a 
restricted person, a second degree felony, see id. § 76-10-503(2)(a); 
and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony, see id. § 76-8-
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306(3)(a).2 Defendant entered into a plea bargain, agreeing to 
plead guilty to murder if the other charges were dismissed. At 
the plea hearing, Defendant acknowledged he knew that by 
pleading guilty he was waiving his constitutional rights, 
including the right to the presumption of innocence and the 
right to a jury trial.3 Defendant further acknowledged that he 
understood everything that his counsel had discussed with him, 
including the plea affidavit. The court then inquired whether 
Defendant had any questions about the plea affidavit, to which 
Defendant replied that he did not.  
 After trial counsel described the factual basis for ¶4
Defendant’s murder charge, Defendant made statements 
implying that he acted in self-defense: 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your Honor, on April 4th 2010 
in Salt Lake County [Defendant] confronted a man 
who had been sleeping with his wife. An argument 
and subsequent fight took place at which time he 
pulled out a firearm and he shot the man killing 
him. 
THE COURT: Is that what happened, [Defendant]? 
                                                                                                                    
2. Because the statutory provisions in effect at the relevant time 
do not differ in any material way from those now in effect, we 
cite the current version of the Utah Code for convenience.  
 
3. Defendant’s primary language at the time of the plea hearing 
was Spanish. To ensure Defendant understood the court 
proceedings, interpreters were present and the plea affidavit was 
written in both English and Spanish. However, an interpreter 
was not present during out-of-court discussions between 
Defendant and his trial counsel.  
Arriaga v. State 
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THE DEFENDANT: I defended myself. It was not 
my intention. I never thought about hurting him. 
. . . . 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we had—
discussed the imperfect self-defense concept and 
that he did pull out a gun to get the man to confess 
to sleeping with his wife. And that the man 
charged at him but he was unarmed. So that is why 
he used a gun. 
THE COURT: I will find that that is a sufficient 
factual basis. 
THE DEFENDANT: He was drugged and drunk 
and I didn’t know if he had a weapon, a knife and 
that’s why I— 
After Defendant made these statements, the district court 
clarified with Defendant that he intentionally killed Victim by 
asking Defendant whether he knew that by pulling the trigger he 
would cause Victim’s death. Defendant acknowledged that he 
did. After entering his guilty plea, Defendant asked to be 
sentenced immediately and waived the right to withdraw his 
plea.  
 After a few months in prison, Defendant filed a petition ¶5
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, see Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78B-9-101 to -405 (LexisNexis 2012), arguing that his plea was 
involuntary because his attorney explained his plea to him 
without the assistance of an interpreter. He also raised an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on that same basis, 
specifically arguing that counsel’s failure to use an interpreter 
resulted in Defendant not knowing that he had a valid 
self-defense argument and could have taken his case to trial. The 
State filed a response to his petition, asserting that Defendant 
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had not carried his burden of establishing by a preponderance of 
the evidence that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient 
and prejudicial. The State also contended that the nature of 
Defendant’s plea was both voluntary and knowing because any 
misunderstandings regarding his plea that arose out of his 
communications with his attorney were cured by his plea 
affidavit and plea colloquy, both of which had been translated 
into Spanish.  
 An evidentiary hearing was held, but suspended, and in ¶6
the meantime, the State moved for summary judgment. Granting 
the State’s motion, the district court concluded that Defendant 
had failed to show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient 
and that all constitutional prerequisites for a valid guilty plea 
had been satisfied in Defendant’s case. Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 Defendant contends that the district court erred in ¶7
granting the State’s motion for summary judgment for two 
reasons. First, he argues that his plea was not knowing or 
voluntary, asserting he did not understand the essential 
elements of his murder charge at the time of his plea. Second, he 
argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient for 
failure to use an interpreter during their out-of-court 
discussions. 
 “We review an appeal from an order dismissing or ¶8
denying a petition for postconviction relief for correctness 
without deference to the lower court’s conclusions of law.” 
Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 55, 234 P.3d 1115 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). “Similarly, we review a grant 
of summary judgment for correctness, granting no deference to 
the lower court.” Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ¶ 18, 293 P.3d 345 
(brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).  
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ANALYSIS 
I.  Defendant’s Plea  
 Defendant contends that his self-defense statements and ¶9
the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea demonstrate that 
he did not understand the elements of the murder charge against 
him, which rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary.4 For 
a guilty plea to be valid under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it must be made “voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Bradshaw v. 
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). For that reason, “[i]t is the responsibility of the 
district court to ensure that defendants enter pleas knowingly 
and voluntarily.” State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 14, 309 P.3d 
230. And rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides courts with a “roadmap for ensuring that defendants 
receive adequate notice of their rights and for examining 
defendants’ subjective understanding and intent.” Id. 
 Rule 11 states that a district court may not accept a guilty ¶10
plea until it has found that the defendant understands his 
constitutional rights, including his right to the presumption of 
innocence and his right to a jury trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). 
Additionally, the court must ensure that the defendant knows 
                                                                                                                    
4. The State argues that Defendant’s involuntary plea claim is 
procedurally barred as Defendant did not raise it in a motion to 
withdraw his plea before being sentenced. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-9-106(1)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017) (stating that a person is 
ineligible for postconviction relief on any ground that “could 
have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal”). Defendant’s 
argument is unsuccessful in this appeal, so we do not dwell on 
whether it is also procedurally barred. 
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“the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is 
entered.” Id. R. 11(e)(4)(A). It is not enough for the district court 
to give notice to the defendant; the court must also find that “the 
defendant actually understood the charges, the constitutional 
rights, and the likely consequences of the plea and voluntarily 
chose to plead guilty.” Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 16 (emphasis 
added).  
 Defendant asserts that he lacked a meaningful ¶11
understanding of the murder charge, and he points to his 
self-defense statements during the plea colloquy to demonstrate 
this lack of understanding. But the transcript of the plea colloquy 
shows that any misunderstanding Defendant may have had was 
inconsequential given his acknowledgements during the plea 
colloquy that he understood the contents of his plea affidavit 
and that he understood everything counsel had explained to 
him.  
 Within the plea affidavit, prepared in both English and ¶12
Spanish, Defendant stated that the elements of the crime for 
which he was pleading guilty were that “[Defendant] did 
knowingly and intentionally cause[] the death of another.” He 
also stated that the facts providing a basis for these elements 
were that on April 4, 2010, he “confront[ed] a man who slept 
[with his] wife” and “fought with the man and subsequently 
shot him, killing him.” Based on Defendant’s assurances in the 
plea colloquy that he had reviewed and understood his plea 
affidavit, there is no doubt that Defendant understood the 
elements of the murder charge at the time of his guilty plea.  
 Defendant also argues that his self-defense claims ¶13
“negated an essential element of the murder charge and 
provided objective evidence that he did not understand the 
proceedings.” When a defendant puts an affirmative defense at 
issue during trial, “the State carries the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including 
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the absence of an affirmative defense[.]” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, 
¶ 45, 192 P.3d 867 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Accordingly, a “necessary element of a murder 
conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses.” Id. When 
Defendant made his statements indicating that he acted in self-
defense, his trial counsel explained to the court that the concept 
of imperfect self-defense had been explained to Defendant, 
specifically in relation to the facts of his case, including counsel’s 
assessment that it was not a viable defense.5 And “[w]here a 
defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court 
usually may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant 
has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the 
charge to which he is pleading guilty.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 
                                                                                                                    
5. Imperfect self-defense “is an affirmative defense to a charge of 
murder” in cases where “the defendant caused the death of 
another . . . under a reasonable belief that the circumstances 
provided a legal justification or excuse for the conduct although 
the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2017). And so the “difference between perfect 
self-defense and imperfect self-defense is the determination of 
whether the defendant’s conduct was, in fact, legally justifiable 
or excusable under the existing circumstances.” State v. Low, 2008 
UT 58, ¶ 32, 192 P.3d 867 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2017) 
(providing that, in cases of perfect self-defense, lethal force is 
justified “only if the person reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury . . . as a result 
of another person’s imminent use of unlawful force”). But the 
use of lethal force is not justified when the defendant “initially 
provokes the use of force against the person with the intent to 
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant” 
or when the defendant “was the aggressor” and did not 
withdraw from the encounter. Id. § 76-2-402(2)(a)(i), (iii). 
Arriaga v. State 
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U.S. 175, 183 (2005). Trial counsel assured the district court that 
the concept of imperfect self-defense had been explained to 
Defendant, and where Defendant had previously told the court 
he understood everything counsel had explained to him, it was 
reasonable for the court to conclude that Defendant understood 
how the imperfect self-defense theory applied in his case. 
Furthermore, with the benefit of an interpreter during the plea 
colloquy, Defendant made no objection to trial counsel’s 
assurance that Defendant understood. 
 We do, however, recognize that Defendant’s statements ¶14
suggesting possible self-defense did raise a question of whether 
he intended to kill Victim because he stated, “It was not my 
intention. I never thought about hurting him.” It was therefore 
necessary for the court to address the conflict between this 
statement and his plea affidavit. See State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 
216, 217 (Utah 1991) (“‘Any omissions or ambiguities in the 
affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any 
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy.’”) 
(quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
And the court did address this conflict by asking Defendant 
whether he knew that his actions, specifically pulling the trigger 
of the gun, would cause Victim’s death. Defendant 
acknowledged that he did.  
 Defendant further contends that he did not understand ¶15
his guilty plea because he “speaks Spanish, has a fifth-grade 
education, and did not speak English except a few random 
words at the time he pleaded guilty,” while “[h]is trial counsel 
did not speak Spanish.” He additionally claims not to have read 
the plea affidavit before signing it. But these claims contradict 
Defendant’s statements to the district court during his plea 
hearing. Defendant is bound by his statements because “the 
representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor 
at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge 
accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any 
Arriaga v. State 
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subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open 
court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 
431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). “Accordingly, the truth and accuracy of 
a defendant’s statements during the [plea colloquy] should be 
regarded as conclusive in the absence of a believable, valid 
reason justifying a departure from the apparent truth of his [plea 
colloquy] statements.” United States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188, 1205 
(10th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, there is no valid reason to doubt the truthfulness of 
Defendant’s statements to the district court during his plea 
colloquy because an interpreter was present and Defendant 
professed to understand everything discussed with counsel and 
the contents of his plea affidavit. Because there is nothing in the 
record that suggests Defendant lacked an understanding of the 
elements of the murder charge against him or anything but his 
own later assertions that he did not actually understand the 
essence of imperfect self-defense, the district court did not err in 
concluding on summary judgment that his plea was voluntarily 
and knowingly made. 
II. Assistance of Counsel 
 Defendant contends that his trial counsel’s performance ¶16
was deficient because no interpreter was present during their 
out-of-court discussions prior to his plea hearing. To prevail on 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 
show that (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient in that it ‘fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness’” and 
(2) “counsel’s performance was prejudicial in that ‘there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 87, 150 P.3d 480 (quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).  
 Defendant must first show that “counsel’s representation ¶17
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 
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466 U.S. at 688. Defendant asserts that the language barrier with 
his trial counsel prevented him from becoming aware of his right 
to the presumption of innocence and his right to plead not 
guilty. He claims that his counsel’s conduct fell below the 
standard of reasonableness when he did not secure an 
interpreter to better communicate these rights to Defendant. 
Nevertheless, any “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance 
must be highly deferential” and “a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. And whether 
counsel’s conduct was reasonable “may be determined or 
substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or 
actions.” Id. at 691.  
 Here, Defendant claims that he only knew a few words of ¶18
English at the time of his plea hearing and that trial counsel did 
not speak Spanish. But with an interpreter present, Defendant 
never advised the court that there was any issue in 
communicating with his counsel. He specifically acknowledged 
in the plea colloquy, during which an interpreter was present, 
that he understood everything counsel had explained to him. 
Had there been an insurmountable language barrier, Defendant 
had the opportunity to raise this issue with the court in the plea 
hearing on several occasions when asked by the court whether 
he understood everything his counsel had discussed with him 
and whether he had questions about the plea affidavit. We 
therefore are not persuaded that trial counsel acted 
unreasonably in failing to secure an interpreter for his 
out-of-court consultations with Defendant.  
 We do appreciate the importance of interpreters, but any ¶19
suggestion that we should err on the side of requiring an 
interpreter in this case is dispelled by the other basis on which 
Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim can be rejected. 
Defendant does nothing to establish that counsel’s failure to 
secure an interpreter was prejudicial. To contest his guilty plea 
Arriaga v. State 
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on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant 
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would 
have been rational under the circumstances.” Rippey v. State, 
2014 UT App 240, ¶ 14, 337 P.3d 1071 (emphasis in original) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant must 
do more than allege that he would not have pled guilty had his 
counsel secured an interpreter for their out-of-court discussions. 
Rather, we “look to the factual circumstances surrounding the 
plea” and whether it would have been rational for Defendant to 
reject the plea and insist on a trial. Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 At the time of the State’s plea offer, Defendant had ¶20
already confessed to killing Victim, and a motion to suppress 
that confession had been denied by the district court. Defendant 
asserts that, had trial counsel better explained the elements of 
murder to Defendant, he would have known he had a valid 
claim for imperfect self-defense based on his statement to 
officers that Victim lunged at him during the confrontation. But 
the imperfect-self-defense theory is substantially undermined by 
the fact that, in what Defendant characterized as a tussle over the 
gun that he brought only to scare Victim, Victim was shot five 
times, including twice in the back and once in the back of the 
head. Based on these circumstances, there is nothing to suggest 
that it would have been rational for Defendant to reject the 
State’s offer to dismiss the other two felony charges against him 
in exchange for his guilty plea to the murder charge.  
CONCLUSION 
 Defendant’s statements and actions do not demonstrate ¶21
that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary or that his 
counsel performed deficiently by not having an interpreter 
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present during their out-of-court discussions. Additionally, he 
fails to establish any prejudice as a result of this decision by 
counsel. We thus presume Defendant’s counsel rendered 
constitutionally adequate assistance, exercising reasonable 
professional judgment, and the district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment to the State. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
 
POHLMAN, Judge (concurring in part and concurring in the 
result in part): 
 I concur with the lead opinion except as to Part I, in which ¶22
I concur in the result. I am troubled by my colleagues’ 
conclusion that the district court adequately remedied the 
conflict between the statements in Defendant’s plea affidavit and 
his self-defense assertions during the plea colloquy. See supra 
¶ 14. Defendant interjected statements that created a conflict 
about the nature of his plea. In my view, it is questionable 
whether the court’s attempts to resolve the conflict were 
successful. 
 The court apparently recognized the significance of ¶23
Defendant’s initial assertion that he “defended [him]self,” and it 
attempted to resolve the apparent conflict between his plea 
affidavit and that assertion by asking defense counsel if it 
changed the plea. But although counsel explained that he had 
“discussed the imperfect self-defense concept” with Defendant, 
he did not explain what Defendant understood. Thus, counsel’s 
representation did not resolve the conflict or demonstrate that 
Defendant understood he was waiving any potential defenses in 
pleading guilty to first degree murder. 
 Defendant further added to the confusion when he ¶24
interjected that he shot Victim because “[Victim] was drugged 
and drunk and [Defendant] didn’t know if [Victim] had a 
Arriaga v. State 
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weapon.” The court again tried to resolve the conflict, this time 
asking Defendant whether he knew that his actions would cause 
Victim’s death. Defendant acknowledged that he knew “by 
pulling the trigger” of the gun he could cause Victim’s death, but 
that acknowledgement did not speak to the conflict created by 
his assertions: whether he understood that in pleading guilty to 
first degree murder he was conceding that the concept of 
imperfect self-defense did not apply. 
 Thus, I question whether the ambiguities introduced in ¶25
the plea hearing regarding the nature of Defendant’s plea were 
resolved by the court’s colloquy. See State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 
212, ¶ 16, 73 P.3d 985 (recognizing the district court’s obligation 
to clarify discrepancies during the plea colloquy). However, I 
concur in the result and would affirm the district court’s decision 
based on Defendant’s failure to demonstrate prejudice. 
 Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, “[t]he court ¶26
may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the 
petitioner establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the 
post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence and facts 
introduced at trial or during sentencing.” Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-9-104(2) (LexisNexis 2012); see also Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 
46, ¶ 62, 234 P.3d 1115. A petitioner must satisfy the same 
standard to obtain relief based on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Landry v. State, 2016 UT App 164, ¶ 23 n.6, 
380 P.3d 25. 
 On appeal, Defendant relies on the same arguments to ¶27
satisfy this standard for his claims based on the voluntariness of 
his plea and his claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In addressing Defendant’s challenge based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we conclude that he failed to demonstrate 
that, absent the claimed errors, he would have rejected the 
State’s plea offer and that it would have been rational under the 
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circumstances to do so. See supra ¶¶ 19–20; see also Rippey v. State, 
2014 UT App 240, ¶ 14, 337 P.3d 1071 (requiring a petitioner 
challenging the voluntariness of his plea based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel to “show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that 
such a decision would have been rational under the 
circumstances” (quotation simplified)). I believe this deficiency 
is equally fatal to Defendant’s challenge based on the voluntary 
nature of his plea. For the same reasons he fails to demonstrate 
prejudice arising out of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, he has failed to demonstrate prejudice arising out of his 
claim based on the voluntariness of his plea. See supra ¶¶ 19–20. 
On this basis, I would affirm the district court’s decision 
granting summary judgment to the State on Defendant’s 
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Demandante AFIRMACION DEL ACUSADO 
EN APOYO A SU DECLARACION 
ie.~..,n~~ ~,i;~ -\.e:i""' 
Defetlant 
DE CULPABILIDAD Y CERTIFICADO 
DEL ASESOR LEGAL 
Acusado. Case No. /o/~oo~f) 
No. de caso. --------
I, ~- ~,, \c.- s- - Lv......, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of .and that I und~rstand the following facts and rights: 
Yo,---------~ par media de la sig.uiente reconozco y certifico
 que 
he sido asesorado y que entiendo los siguientes hechos y derechos: 
Notification of Charges 
Notificaci6n de Cargos 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 







Crime & Statutory 
Provision 





Min/Max and / or 
Minimum Mandatory 
Pena Min/Max y/o 
Minimo Mandatorio 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read 
it, 
or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest). 
He recibido una copia (reformada) del Documento acusatorio en mi contra. Lo he
 leido, 
o me lo han lei do y entiendo la naturaleza y los. elementos del(os) delito(s) por el (las) cual(es) 
me declar.o culpable (o sin argumento). 
0081
'·· 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) ar
e: 
Los elementos del (los) delito(s) por el (Jos) cual(es) me declaro cul
pable (o sin. 
argumento) son: · 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that ·1 co
mmitted the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contest
ing that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading n
o contest, I do not dispute 
or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and th
e conduct of other 
persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a
 basis for the court to 
accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements
 of the crime(s) to which I 
am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
Entiendo que al declararme culpable estare admitiendo que comet! 
el delito (los delitos) 
mencionado(s) anteriormente. (0, si me declaro sin argumento, no 
disputare que comet[ los 
delitos que anteceden). Yo estipulo y estoy de acuerdo (o si me declaro
 sin argumento, no 
disputo ni refute) que los siguientes hechos describen mi conducta 
y la conducta de otras 
personas por las cuales soy responsable legalmente. Estos hechos 
proveen las bases para 
que el tribunal acepte mi declaraci6n de culpabilidad (o sin argumen
to) y comprueba los 
elementos del delito (los delitos) por el cual (los cuales) me estoy de
clarando culpable (o sin 
argumento): 
1...---.. :_ . k\\:_ k,·,..,., . 
' i 7 
Waiver of Constrtutional Rights 
Renuncia de ios derechos constitucionales 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have
 the following 
rights under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States.
 I also understand that 
if I plead guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Doy esta declaraci6n voluntariamente. Entiendo que tengo los siguie
ntes derechos 
bajo la constituci6n de Utah y de los Estados Unidos. Tambien entie
ndo que si me declaro 
culpable (o sin argumento) renunciare a los siguientes derechos 
0082
,: . . ·• .. 
Counsel: I ·know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney a
nd that if 
I cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no co
st to me. I 
understand that I might later, if the judge determined that l was able, 
be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
Asesoramiento: Se que tengo el derecho de ser representado por un abog
ado y que si 
no puedo costear uno, se me asignara un abogado por parte del tribunal sin
 costo alguno para 
mi. Entiendo que posteriormente, si el juez determinara que soy solvente s
e me requerira 
pagar por los servicios de! abogado que me tue asignado. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my ri
ght to 
counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the
 following 
reasons: 
He (no he) renunciado a mi derecho de asesora miento legal. Si he renunc
iado a mi 
derecho de asesoramiento legal, lo he hecho a sabiendas, inteligente y volu
ntariamente 
por las siguientes razones: 
If I have waived my rights to counsel, I certify that I have read this sta
tement 
and that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crim
es to which I 
am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also understand my rights in this 
case and other 
cases and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Si yo he renunciado a mi derecho de asesoramiento legal, certifico que he l
ef do esta 
afirmaci6n y que entiendo la naturaleza·y los elementos de los cargos y de!i
tos por los cuales · 
me declaro culpable (o sin argumento). Tambien entiendo mis derecho-s en 
este caso y otros 
cases y las consecuencias de mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad 
If I have no waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
v \, e <./ • My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my
 
. rights, a d the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Si no he renunciado a mi derecho de asesoria legal, mi abogado es 
_________ . Mi abogado y yo hemes platicado a fondo de es
ta afirmaci6n, mis 
derechos y las consecuencias de mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de cuipabilidad (o sin
 argumento) 
Jury Trial: I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an imp
artial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty 
(or no contest). 
Juicio por jurado. Se que tengo el derecho a un juicio pubiico y sin demora ante un 
jurado imparcial (sin prejuicio) y que estare renunciando a ese derecho al de
clararme culpable 
(o sin argumento). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses: I know that if I we
re to 
have a trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnes
ses who testified 
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an at
torney, would 
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testifie
d against me. 
0083
l: • •••• 
Careo y contra interrogatorio de los testigos. Se que si tuviera un jLiicio, a) Tendria 
el derecho de very observar a los testigos que testifiquen en m
i contra y b) mi abogado, o yo 
si renunciara a mi derecho de abogado, tendrf an la oportunidad
 de contra interrogar a todos 
las testigos que testifiquen en mi contra. · 
Right to compel witnesses: I know that if I were to have a trial, I cou
ld call 
witnesses if I chose to, .and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requi
ring the 
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to p
ay for the 
witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Derecho de obligar a testigos. Se que si tuviera un juicio, podr[a elegir Hamar a 
testigos, y podria obtener comparendos requiriendo la asistencia y testim
onio de esos 
testigos. Si no pudiera costear el pago de las testigas, el Estado
 cubrir[a las costas. 
Right to testify and pr;vilege against self-incrimination: I know tha
t if I were 
to have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I als
o know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence a
gainst 
myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told 
that they could 
not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Derecho a testificar y el priviiegio en contra de la auto-incrimina
ci6n. Se que si 
tuviera un juicio, yo tendria el derecho de dar testimonio a mi fa
vor. Tambien se que si no 
deseara testificar, nadie podri a obligarme a dar testimonio o pre
sentar pruebas en contra de 
mi mismo. Tambien se que si yo eligiera no dar testimonio, al ju
rado se le indicarla que no 
podrlan usar mi decision en mi contra. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof: l know that if I do n
ot plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves th
at I am guilty of 
the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I nee
d only plead 
"not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State wou
ld have the 
burden of proving each element of the charges(s) beyond a reasonable
 doubt. If the 
trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each
 juror would 
have to find me guilty. 
· 
Presunci6n de inocencia y responsabilidad de prueba. ·se que si no me declare 
culpable (o sin argumento), se me presume ser inocente hasta 
que la fiscalla compruebe que 
soy culpable del (las) delito(s) imputado(s). Si elijo pelear las cargos en
 rni contra, solo 
necesito declararme "no culpable," y mi caso sera fijado para juicio.
 En el juicio, la fiscalia 
tendria la responsabilidad de comprobar cada uno de las eleme
ntos del (los) cargo(s) mas alla 
de una duda razonable. Si el juicio fuera ante un jurado, el vered
icto debera ser unanime, 
quiere decir que cada miembro del jurado tendra que encontrarm
e culpable 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presump
tion of_ 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated ab
ove. 
Entiendo que si me declaro culpable (o sin argumento), renuncio
 a fa presunci6n de 
inocencia y admitire que comet[ el (los) de[ito(s) previamente me
ncionado(s). 
0084
Appeal: I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I we
re convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction a
nd sentence. If I could not 
afford the costs of an appeal, the State would pay thos
e costs for me. I understand 
that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I
 plead guilty (or no contest). I 
understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must 
file a notice of appeal within 30 
days after my sentence is entered. 
Apelaci6n. Se que bajo la Constituci6n de Utah, si fue
ra condenado por un jurado o 
juez, tendda el derecho de apelar mi condena y sentencia
. Si no pudiera costear las costas de 
la apelaci6n, el Estado cubriria esas costas. Entiendo 
que al declararme culpable (o sin 
argumento) renuncio a mi derecho de apelar mi conde
na. Entiendo que si deseo apelar mi 
sentencia debo presentar notificaci6n de mi apelaci6n
 dentro de treinta dias despues de 
asentada mi sentencia 
l know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waivin
g and giving up 
.all the statutory and constitutional rights as explain
ed above. 
Se y entiendo que al declararme culpable, renuncio y ced
o todos mis derechos 
estatutarios y constitucionales previamente explicados. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or ·No Contest) Plea
 
Consecuencias de dar una declaraci6n de culpabiiidad 
(o sin argumento) 
Potential penalties: 1 know the maximum sentence tha
t may be imposed for 
each crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest)
. I know that by pleading guilty 
(or no contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory pen
alty, I will be subjecting myself 
to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know m
y sentence may include a 
prison term, fine, or both. 
Penas potenciales. Se la pena maxima que se podria imponer por cada de
lito del 
cual me estoy declarando culpable (o sin argumento). 
Se que al declararme culpable (o sin 
argumento) de un delito que lleve consigo una pena ob
ligatoria, me estare sujetando a servir 
la pena obligatoria por ese delito. Se que mi sentencia
 puede incluir un termino en la prisi6n, 
una multa o ambos 
I know that in addition to a fine, an ninety percent (90%
) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make re
stitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on c
harges that are dismissed as 
part of a plea agreement. 
Se que aunado a una multa, se impondra un noventa p
or ciento (90%) en recargos. 
Tambien se que se me podria ordenar reintegrar a cua
lquier victima de mis delitos, incluyendo 
reintegro que se deba por cargos que sean desestimad
os como parte de! trato declaratorio. 
0085
... 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms: I know that if-there is mo
re than one 
crime involved, the sentences may be imposed one after anoth
er (consecutively), or 
they may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I ma
y be charged an 
additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am o
n probation or 
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I ha
ve been convicted or 
which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contes
t) plea·(s) now may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the of
fense to which I am 
now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on paro
le, I know the law 
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and stat
es 
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropria
te. 
Terminos de prisi6n consecutivos/simultaneos. Se que si hubiera m
as de-un delito 
involucrado, las penas podrian ser impuestas una despues de la otra
 (consecutivamente), o 
podrian ser servidas al mismo tiempo, (simultaneamente). Se que se
 me podria cobrar una 
multa adicional par cada delito por el cual haya dado mi declaraci6n. 
Tambien se que si estoy 
bajo libertad provisional o preparatoria, 6 si estoy esperando recibir s
entencia por algun otro 
delito por el cual haya sido condenado o me haya declarado culpable
 (o sin argumento), mi(s) 
declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argumento) que doy ahora pod
rian resuftar en fa 
imposici6n de sentencias consecutivas. Si el delito por el cual me es
toy declarando culpable 
sucedi6 cuando me encontraba preso o bajo libertad preparatoria, se
 que la ley requiere que 
el tribunal imponga sentencias consecutivas a menos que el tribunal 
falle y haga -constar en el 
acta que las sentencias consecutivas serian inapropiadas. 
Plea agreement: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the r
esult 
of a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorn
ey. All the promises, 
duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully con
tained in this 
statement, including those explained below: 
· Trato declaratorio. Mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin a
rgumento) es (son) el 
resuftado de un. trato declaratorio que he hecho con el abogado fiscal
. Todas las promesas, 
deberes y provisiones de este trato declaratorio, si hubiera alguno, se
 encuentran en su 
totalidad en esta afirmaci6n, incluyendo aquellas explicadas a contin
uaci6n: 
Trial judge not bound: I know that any charge or sentencing c
oncession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including
 a reduction of the 
charges for sentencing, made or sought by either defense coun
sel or the prosecuting 
attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opin
ions they express to 
me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on 
the judge. 
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El juez de primera instancia no esta obligado. Se que cualquier cargo, o concesi6n 
de sentencia o recomendaci6n de libertad condicional, o sentenc
ia suspendida, incluyendo 
una reducci6n de los cargos para el dictado de la sentencia, que 
haya sido hecho o solicitado 
ya sea por el abogado de defensa o el fiscal no son obligatorias p
ara el juez. Tambien se que 
cualquier idea expresada ante mi concerniente a lo que se piensa
 que el juez pueda hacer no 
son obligatorias para el juez. 
Immigration/Deportation: I understand that if I am not a United States citiz
en, 
my plea(s) today may, or even will, subject me to deportation und
er United States 
immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely affect m
y immigration status, 
which may include permanently barring my re-entry into the Unite
d States. I 
understand that if I have questions about the effect of my plea on my imm
igration 
status, I should consult with an immigration attorney. 
inmigraci6n/Deportaci6n: Entiendo que si no soy ciudadano de l
os Estado Unidos, 
mi(s) declaraci6n(es) del d[a de hoy podria, o ciertamente me su
jetara a deportaci6n bajo las 
!eyes y reglamentos de inmigraci6n de los Estado Unidos, o de o
tra manera afectaran 
negativamente mi estado migratorio, que podria incluir el impedir
 mi reingreso a los Estados 
Unidos. Entiendo que si tengo preguntas acerca del efecto que te
ndra mi declaraci6n de 
culpabiiidad en mi estado migratorio, debo consulter con un abog
ado de emigraci6n. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
Certificaci6n de voluntariedad .del acusado 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threat
s or 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead g
uilty (or no 
contest). No promises except those contained in this statement h
ave been made to 
me. 
Estoy dando esta declaraci6n par mi propia y libre voluntad. No s
e han utilizado fuerza 
rii amenazas o coacci6n de ningun tipo para convencerme de dec
lararme culpable (o sin 
argumento). Nose me ha hecho ninguna promesa con excepci6n
 de aquellas que se 
encuentran en esta afirmaci6n. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my atto
rney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own
. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement, but
 I do not wish to 
make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
He le[do esta afirmaci6n, o me la ha leido mi abogado, entiendo s
us contenidos y 
adopto cada afirmaci6n aqui contenida como mia propia. Se que soy lib
re de cambiar o borrar 
cualquier afirmaci6n contenida en este documento pero no deseo
 hacer ningun cambio 
porque todas las afirmaciones en este son correctas. 
I am satisfied with advice and assistance of my attorney. 





- --- - I am 1~ years of age. I have attended school through the L grade. I 
can read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an 
interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drug
s, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead -
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants 
which impair my judgment. 
Tengo _ anos de edad. · He asistido hasta el __ grado escolar. Puedo leer y 
entender el idioma ingles. Si no entiendo el ingles, se me ha proporcionado un interp
rete. No 
me encontraba bajo la influencia de ningun estupefaciente, medicina, o embriagante 
que 
pudiera impedir mi sano juicio cuando decidi declararme culpable. En este momento no me
 
encuentro bajo la influencia de ningun estupefaciente, medicina, o embriagante que 
pueda 
impedir mi sano juicio. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable 
of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. l am free of 
any mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from unders
tanding 
what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
Me considero de mente sana, capaz de discernir y entender este procedimiento y las
 
consecuencias de mi declaraci6n. Estoy libre de cualquier enfermedad mental, defec
to .o 
impedimenta que me evite entender lo que estoy hacienda o que evite que de mi dec
laraci6n 
a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea{s), I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea{s) before sentence is announce
d. 
I understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the ple
a 
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading ·guilty or no contest. I will 
only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after 
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 
78, 
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Entiendo que si quisiera retirar mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin 
argumento), debo presentar una petici6n escrita para retirar mi(s) cieclaraci6n
(es) antes 
que se pronuncie la sentencia. Entiendo que para una Declaraci6n en suspens
o, la 
petici6n para retirarme del trato declaratorio debe ser hecha dentro de treinta
 dias de 
mi declaraci6n de culpabilidad o sin argumento. So!amente se me permitira re
tirar mi 
declaraci6n de culpabilidad si demuestro que no fue dada a sabiendas y 
voluntariamente. Entiendo que para disputar mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpab
ilidad 
despues de recibida ta sentencia debere hacerlo bajo la Ley de Remedios Po
st-
condenatorios Titulo 78, Capitulo 35a, y la Regla 65C del las Reglas del Proce
dimiento 
Penal de Utah. 
Dated this \1 d f "-or:\ 201L ay o --~+\-'-'.-, ___ , . 
Fechado este d1a 
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Certificate of Defense Attorney 
Certificado del abogado defensor 
I certify that I am the attorn.ey for ~- :t?\c\ ~ .... - ~11,-.." , the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read thesttement or that I have read it 
to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands 
the meaning of its contents and is mentaHy and physically competent. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly 
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
Certifico que soy el abogado de ____________ , el acusado 
previamente mencionado, y que se que el/ella ha leido la afirmaci6n o que yo se la he leido a 
el/ella; He hablado con el/ella de esta afirmaci6n y me parece que el fella entiende 
completamente el significado de su contenido yes competente fisica y mentalmente. A mi leal 
saber y entender, despues de una investigaci6n apropiada, los elementos del(los) delito(s) y la 
sinopsis de los hechos de la conducta penada del acusado son correctos; Esto, junta con los 
otros comentarios y aseveraciones hechos por el acusa en el afidavit previo son correctos y 
verdaderos. 
A NEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar 
ABOGADO DEL ACUSADO 
No. del colegio de abogados ___ _ 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
Certificado del abogado fiscal 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
~. ~S ~ \ 0 t,, - \......i_~ defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and 
find that theactual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) ·is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to 
encourage a plea has been offered to defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented 
on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the 
plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public 
interest. 
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Certifico que soy el abogado representando al Estado de Utah en el c
aso en contra de/ 
acusado ______________ . He repasado esta A
firmaci6n del acusado y 
encuentro que los hechas en las que se basa la conducta penal del ac
usado constituyen el 
delito y son verdaderos y correctos. No se ha ofrecido al acusado ningun 
incentivo, amenaza 
o intimidaci6n para alentar su declaraci6n. Las negociaciones para la 
declaraci6n se 
encuentran en su totalidad en esta afirmaci6n yen el Trato declaratari
o adjunta, se han 
suplementado en el acta ante el tribunal. Hay causas razonables para
 creer que la evidencia 
respaldara la condena del acusado par el (los) delito(s) par el (las) ua
l (cuales) da su(s) 
dec1araci6n(es) y que la aceptaci6n de la(s) declar, ci6n(es) servir · intere




No. del colegio de abogadas ___ _ 
Order 
Orden 
Based on the facts set forth 1n the foregoing Statement and the certifica
tions of 
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in co
urt, the Court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's guilty (or no contest)
 plea(s) is/are 
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
Basado en los hechos previamente presentadas yen la certificaci6n d
el(a) acusado(a) 
y su asesor juridico, y basado en las afirmaciones dadas ante el tribunal, el jue
z coma testigo 
de las firmas falla que la(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argu
mento) del acusado ha 
(han) sido dada(s) libre, a sabiendas y voluntariamente 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) ple
a(s) to 
the crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
POR LO TANTO SE ORDENA que la(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilida
d (o sin 
argumento) del acusado presentada en esta Afirmaci6n, sea aceptada
 y asentada. 
Dated this }'111- day of 4 r.,.. ; l ' 2 0 J.L... 
Fechado este dia __ de __________ d~
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